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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Financial institutions of many types historically have financed hold­
ings of long-term maturity assets by borrowing for shorter terms. During 
periods when interest rates were stable and the yield curve maintained an 
upward slope, this strategy resulted in profits from the spread in rates. 
Starting in the mid-1960Ss significant upward shifts in the yield curve 
resulted in losses for many institutions which pursued the strategy of 
borrowing short and lending long. This was especially true for savings 
and loan associations which have traditionally held the major part of 
their asset portfolios in fixed interest rate mortgages with original ma­
turities of twenty years or more, and which have financed these asset po­
sitions by accepting short-term savings and time deposits. The pronounced 
upward movements in interest rates that have been especially prevalent 
since October 1979 have created periods of substantial losses for indi­
vidual savings and loan associations, and, during some periods, signifi­
cant losses for the industry as a whole. 
The recent increase in volatility of interest rates in the United 
States has spawned a rapidly growing interest among both academicians and 
practitioners in the financial industry in hedging against the risk of 
upward shifts of the yield curve. The asset/liability maturity gap tra­
ditionally maintained by savings and loan associations has generated spe­
cial interest and greater urgency among these institutions in developing 
strategies to reduce interest rate risk. The introduction of trading in 
Government National Mortgage Association Collateralized Depository 
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Receipts futures contracts in October, 1975, and in Treasury bond futures 
contracts in August, 1977, provided two alternative instruments which 
could be used to hedge against adverse interest rate movements.^ 
An increase in long-term interest rates will cause the value of mort­
gage portfolios to decline; the longer the term to maturity of these as­
sets, the greater will be the effect on their market value. To the extent 
that a rise in interest rates causes the prices of mortgages and interest 
rate futures to move together, a holder of mortgages can hedge against in­
terest rate movements by selling futures contracts. However, to the ex­
tent that mortgage and futures move together, a strategy of selling fu­
tures contracts to offset adverse movements in the cash value of a port­
folio also eliminates the possibility of gains when long-term interest 
rates decrease and the market value of asset holdings rises. Thus, a 
strategy of hedging against interest rate risks using futures instruments 
will reduce the possibility of both downside loss and upside gain if cash 
and futures instruments' prices move together. 
The volatility of interest rates in recent years and the inception 
of trading in interest rate futures contracts has spawned a substantial 
body of literature concerned with both the theoretical foundations of 
hedging fixed interest rate asset and/or liability positions, and empiri­
cal tests of the efficacy of alternative hedging strategies. The basis 
for much of this research is the pioneering article of Ederington (1979), 
which combined portfolio and futures market theory to derive the risk 
^These contracts are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. The de­
scription of the structure of these contracts and the history of the de­
velopment and market size of trading are presented in Chapter Two. 
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minimizing hedge ratio. Since the publication of Ederington's work, a 
number of articles have been written on the effectiveness of interest rate 
futures instruments for hedging holdings of fixed-rate assets. 
Few of these studies have focused on hedging mortgage portfolio hold­
ings using interest rate futures. Hyman and Jaffee (1981), Kolb, Corgel 
and Chiang (1982) and Starleaf and Langley (1983) have analyzed the risk 
reduction potential of alternative mortgage hedging strategies. However, 
only Starleaf and Langley have tested these strategies empirically. 
With the inception of trading of options on Treasury bond futures 
contracts in October, t982, an additional instrument which could be used 
for hedging against interest rate risk became available. An option on a 
futures contract gives the buyer the right to purchase (a call option) or 
sell (a put option) the futures contract. The advantage of options over 
the actual purchase or sale of futures is that the buyer of the option 
has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise the option. In periods 
when the prices of mortgages and interest rate futures fall, the holder of 
a put option could exercise his/her right to sell the futures instrument 
at a higher price than the current price of the futures contract, thus 
offsetting the loss on the asset holding with a gain on the futures con­
tract. In periods when mortgage and futures prices rise, the holder of a 
put option would not be required to exercise his/her option. The result 
would be that the gain on the asset holding would not be offset by a loss 
2 
on the futures contract. 
Options on Treasury bond futures are currently traded on the Chicago 
Board of Trade. Contract specifications and market characteristics are 
presented in Chapter Two. 
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The literature oh the use of futures options in hedging strategies 
has focused on the theoretical foundations of options strategies or the 
presentation of examples of strategies which could be used to hedge 
against adverse interest rate movements. To date, only Hyman and Jaffee 
have analyzed the use of options in mortgage portfolio hedges, but their 
3 paper contained no empirical testing of these strategies. 
The purpose of the present study is to develop alternative hedging 
strategies that could be used to hedge mortgage portfolios against inter­
est rate risk through the use of combinations of futures and/or options 
contracts, and to evaluate empirically the risk-return distributions of 
the alternative strategies. The structure of the Treasury bond futures 
contract and the options contracts on this instrument are presented in 
Chapter II. Additionally, the development and size of the market are 
discussed. 
The theoretical foundations of hedging and options pricing models 
are developed in Chapter III. The major empirical tests of the hedging 
and options pricing models are also discussed in this chapter. The re­
sults of the empirical tests of the option pricing model used in this 
study are presented in Chapter IV. 
The alternative hedging strategies used are developed in Chapter 
V, as well as.the empirical testing of the risk-return distributions of 
3 The Chicago Board of Trade has published a nunèer of reference 
guides which provide examples of options strategies using Treasury bond 
futures options. Two recent publications are Strategies for Buying and 
Writing Options on U.S. Treasury Futures (1982b) and Options on Treasury 
Bond Futures for Institutional Investors (1983c). Articles in financial 
publications which analyze options strategies for hedging mortgage port­
folio risk include Abbott (1983), Morrissey (1983) and Hartzog (1983). 
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them. The primary areas presented are the data description, delineation 
of alternative strategies, estimation of the optimal hedge ratio, and sta­
tistical estimation of the risk-return distributions of the strategies. 
The sunmary of the results, limitations of the study, and suggestions 
for further research are presented in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
To understand methods of hedging using Treasury bond futures and op­
tions on Treasury bond futures, it is essential that one be familiar with 
the most important institutional details of these markets. Therefore, a 
description of the Treasury bond futures and futures options markets is 
presented in this chapter. 
Treasury Bond Futures: Institutional Features 
A Treasury bond futures contract is a firm commitment by two parties 
to make or take delivery of one or more deliverable grade U.S. Treasury 
bonds during a specified month in the future at a specified price. The 
contract has standardized terms and conditions established by the Chicago 
Board of Trade, and the contracts are traded on this exchange. The seller 
of a contract is said to take a short position, and the purchaser of the 
contract takes a long position. The basic trading unit of the contract is 
$100,000 par value of U.S. Treasury bonds with eight percent coupons. De­
liverable grade bonds are those that mature at least fifteen years from 
the delivery date if not callable, and if callable are not so for at least 
fifteen years from the delivery date. 
The price at which a specific contract is traded is established on 
the trading floor of the Board of Trade. Prices are quoted as a percent­
age of the par value of the contract and have a minimum fluctuation of 
1/32 of a point, which is $31.25 per contract. A price quotation of 74-03 
represents a price of 74.09375 percent of par, or $74,093.75 for one con­
tract. Daily price limits establish the maximum movement of the price of 
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a contract for any one trading day and are set at 64/32, or $2,000, above 
and below the previous day's settlement price. Variable limits, currently 
$3,000, establish a larger range for price movements when the price of the 
future has closed up or down the limit for three consecutive days in three 
or more contract months during a business year. The settlement price is 
the average price for all trades completed during the last two minutes of 
the trading day. 
Currently, contracts are traded for four delivery months during each 
year — March, June, September and December. At any time there is trading 
in contracts that mature in more than one year. For example, on June 20, 
1984, a total of eleven contracts were traded: three for 1984 maturity 
dates, four for 1985, and four for 1986. Thus, a trader could buy or sell 
a contract which matured approximately two and one-half years hence. 
Each contract expires during the month of the contract date with no 
trades taking place during the last seven days of the business month. If 
a position is not offset prior to expiration of the contract, the holder 
of the short position (the seller of the contract) decides which eligible 
Treasury bonds to deliver. If the bonds to be delivered do not have a 
coupon rate of interest of eight percent, the price at which they are in­
voiced is determined such that the yield of the bonds is eight percent. 
The Board of Trade determines conversion factors for all eligible bonds 
for each futures contract expiration date. These conversion factors are 
based on the coupon rate of the Treasury bond and its time to maturity or, 
if callable, the first call date. There were twenty-four deliverable 
grade Treasury bonds for the June, 1984, futures contract. A sample of 
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these is presented in Table 2-1, with different coupon rates and maturity 
or call dates.^ 
Table 2-1. T-bonds deliverable on the June, 1984, T-bond futures contract 
Coupon Maturity Conversion factor 
7 5/8 February 15, 2002-07 .9650 
8 3/4 November 15, 2003-08 1.0728 
10 May 15, 2005-10 1.2007 
13 1/8 May 15, 2001 1.4681 
15 3/4 November 15, 2001 1.7180 
11 5/8 November 15, 2002 1.3446 
10 3/4 May 15, 2003 1.2645 
11 5/8 August 15, 2003 1.3026 
The seller of the futures contract delivering an eligible bond calcu­
lates the invoice amount for a particular bond by multiplying the futures 
settlement price by the appropriate conversion factor and adding any ac­
crued interest. The buyer of the contract on which delivery is made then 
takes on an investment with a yield equal to the yield he/she would have 
received had he/she paid the settlement price and received an eight per­
cent coupon. Assume that a June, 1984, T-bond futures contract has a set­
tlement price of 82-20. If the seller chooses to deliver the May 15, 
2005-10 contract, the conversion factor is 1.2007. The invoice price is; 
Invoice Amount = .82625 x 1.2007 x $100,000 = $99,207.34. 
Thus, the seller would invoice the buyer $99,207.84 plus any accrued 
^The data on Treasury bond futures trading for June 20, 1984, is pre­
sented in Table 2.2 and is taken from the WalZ Street Journal of June 21, 
1984. 
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2 interest on the bonds. Although it is important to understand the de­
livery process, a large percentage of T-bond futures positions are offset 
before expiration. This is done by. a seller (purchaser) of a contract 
purchasing (selling) another contract for the same maturity date. As an 
example of the relatively infrequent delivery, in 1980, less than one-half 
of one percent of all T-bond futures contracts were settled by delivery. 
There are two types of costs of trading in futures contracts — margin 
and commission costs. Each purchaser or seller of a contract must post an 
initial margin; currently this is $2,000 per contract. The margin is 
posted with the Chicago Board of Trade Clearing Corporation and is held un­
til the trader offsets his/her position or the contract expires. The re­
quired margin for a hedged position is currently $1,500. This initial 
margin is a performance bond which ensures that the trader makes his/her 
potential losses good in advance. There is also a maintenance margin 
which is the additional deposit a trader must make to hold a deposit when 
the price of the contract moves adversely for his/her position. For ex­
ample, if the maintenance margin is $2,000 and Treasury bond futures 
prices fall by 40/32 of a point, the purchaser of a T-bond futures con­
tract would lose $1,250 and must, therefore, deposit sufficient funds to 
2 The invoice amount is calculated as: 
Settlement price in decimal equivalents x conversion factor x 
contract size + accrued interest. 
In this instance, the invoice amount is: 
Invoice amount = .82625 x 1.2007 x $100,000 + accrued interest • 
= $99,207.84 + accrued interest. 
^These margins are established by the Board of Trade, are subject to 
change, and may not reflect actual margin deposits required by member 
firms. 
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bring his/her account back to the initial margin. However, any gains on 
price fluctuations can be immediately withdrawn. In this example, the 
seller of the contract could withdraw his/her $1,250 if the initial margin 
deposit were maintained. These positions are "marked-to-market," which 
means that they are settled after each trading day, and a trader for whom 
the price movement is adverse must add the required funds to his/her ac­
count by the start of the next trading day. The cost of the margin ac­
count to a trader is then the interest earnings foregone on the margin de­
posit. 
Commission costs are those charges assessed by clearing menters for 
undertaking trades. These fees vary among firms, the size of the trade, 
and the customer's relationship to the trading firm, but are generally in 
the neighborhood of $50. Commission charges are assessed on a "round 
turn" basis, i.e., the commission fee covers both the entry into and exit 
from the futures market. 
The Size of the Treasury Bond Futures Market 
Since the inception of trading in Treasury bond futures on July 22, 
1977, this contract has become the most actively traded of any futures 
contract in the world. The volume of trading and number of outstanding 
contracts is the open interest. Open interest figures are for the total 
nunter of contracts outstanding, not the sum of positions taken. As of 
June 19, 1984, there were 195,684 contracts outstanding for all contracts 
traded on this date (see Table 2-2). Generally, trading is largest for 
contracts closest to maturity, as is indicated by the 138,261 outstanding 
September, 1984, contracts which was 70.7% of all outstanding contracts. 
11 
Although there were only 22,889 outstanding contracts for the June, 1984, 
contract, this is not unusual, because it was close to the contract ex­
piration date and most positions had already been offset. 
Table 2-2. Treasury bond futures data for June 20, 1984 
Contract Settlement price 
Open 
interest 
June 1984 61-19 22,889 
September 1984 60-23 138,261 
December 1984 60-06 15,519 
March 1985 59-25 6,256 
June 1985 59-14 4,181 
September 1985 59-06 1,215 
December 1985 58-31 1,419 
March 1986 58-25 1,845 
June 1986 58-20 3,133 
September 1986 58-16 884 
December 1986 58-13 82 
Total open interest 195,684 
Even though the market for contracts farther from maturity is thin­
ner than for nearby contracts, there is still substantial trading in those 
contracts with maturities from six to twelve months in the future — those 
contracts which could be used for hedges of this length. There is also 
substantial trading each day. On June 20, 1984, the total volume of con­
tracts traded was 127,107, almost two-thirds of the outstanding contracts. 
There has been a steady growth in volume since the inception of trading. 
In 1978, average daily volume was only approximately 2,000 contracts; by 
1980, this volume had grown to approximately 33,000 contracts and, in 
1982, it was approximately 61,000 contracts. 
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Options on Treasury Bond Futures: 
Institutional Features 
Trading in options on Treasury bond futures was initiated in October, 
1982. There are two types of options, puts and calls, and a trader can 
either write (sell) or purchase an option. A purchaser of a call (put) 
option on a Treasury bond future acquires the right to assume a long 
(short) position in one T-bond futures contract of a specified month at a 
price (the strike or exercise price) established when the option is pur­
chased. The seller, or writer, of a call (put) option has the obligation 
of taking a short (long) position in the futures market if the buyer of 
the option exercises his/her right. A writer of a call (put) option 
agrees to sell (buy) one T-bond futures contract at a specified price if 
the buyer decides to exercise the option. T-bond futures options are 
American options, which means that the holder of the option has the right 
to exercise it at any time prior to its expiration. Options which can be 
exercised only at expiration are called European options. 
The trading unit for options contracts is one $100,000 face value 
Chicago Board of Trade U.S. Treasury bond futures contract of a specified 
contract month. Trading months for options are the same as for T-bond fu­
tures: currently March, June, September, and December. The price at 
which the futures contract can be purchased or sold is called the strike 
or exercise price and trading is conducted at prices in integral multiples 
of two points ($2,000) per T-bond futures contract. On June 20, 1984, ex­
ercise prices for call options on the September, 1984, futures contract 
ranged from 58 to 80 in increments of two points (see Table 2-3). A 
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strike price of 64 on a call option would mean that the purchaser of the 
call could purchase one $100,000 par value T-bond futures contract for 
$64,000, and, if the option is exercised, the writer of the option would 
be obligated to take a short position (sell the contract) at this price. 
These strike prices are established at the initiation of trading of the 
options contract; when the price of the underlying futures contract is 
midway between the highest two, or lowest two, existing strike prices, a 
new strike price is added for the contract. 
The price paid for the option is called the option premium and is de­
termined by open outcry on the trading floor of the Board of Trade. These 
prices are quoted in multiples of 1/64 of one percent of a $100,000 con­
tract. Each 1/64 of a point movement represents a $15.63 change in the 
option premium. On June 20, 1984, the premium for a call option on the 
December, 1984, futures contract with a strike price of 64 closed at 1-14. 
The purchaserof this option would pay $1,218.75 for the right to purchase 
one December, 1984, T-bond futures contract at a price of $64,000. 
Table 2-3. Options on Treasury bond futures Wednesday, June 20, 1984 
p._ Calls-last Puts-last 
cut II^C 
price Sep 84 Dec 84 Mar 85 Sep 84 Dec 84 Mar 85 
58 3-23 0-59 1-36 2-13 
60 2-05 2-38 2-62 1-28 2-27 3-11 
62 1-11 1-51 2-10 2-28 3-35 — —  
64 0-37 1-14 1-34 3-52 4-58 —  —  
66 0-17 0-46 1-03 5-27 6-20 —  —  
68 0-06 0-29 —  —  7-18 8-02 
70 0-02 0-19 9-18 —  —  —  —  
Calls: Volume (6/19/84) 14,792 open interest 171,738 
Puts: Volume (6/19/84) 8,335 open interest 92,876 
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The premiums on put and call options depend on a number of factors; 
the theoretical foundations of the determination of futures options prices 
are developed in Chapter III. One factor is the strike price relative 
to the current futures price. For call options, the larger is the current 
futures price relative to the call's strike price, the larger will be the 
premium, other things equal. For put options, the larger the current fu­
tures price relative to its strike price, the lower will be its premium, 
other things equal. For a call (put) option, a futures price greater 
(less) than the strike price would enable the holder of the option to pur­
chase (sell) the futures contract at a price which is less (greater) than 
its current market price. The larger is this gap, the more valuable is 
this option; hence, the larger will be premium commanded for this right.* 
On June 20, the premium on a December, 1984, call with a strike price of 
60 was 3-28, while the premium for the same maturity call with a strike 
price of 64 was only 1-14. The opposite is true for the put; the premium 
for a strike price of 60 was 2-27, while it was 4-58 for a strike price 
of 64. 
The premiums on options with the same strike price also vary by the 
length of time until maturity of the underlying futures contract. For 
both put and call options, the longer the time to maturity, the larger 
will be the premium, other things equal. 
call option is in-the-money when the current futures price is 
greater than the strike price. When the futures price is less than the 
strike price, the call is out-of-the-money. The opposite relationships 
exist for put options. 
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For example, the premium for a December, 1984, call with a strike 
price of 60 was 2-38 on June 20, while the March, 1985, call premium was 
2-62 for this strike price. For the same futures maturity dates and 
strike price, the respective put premiums were 2-27 and 3-11, respective­
ly. 
Daily trading limits for the option premiums are the same as for T-
bond futures, which are currently two points, or $2,000; i.e., the option 
premium could move a maximum of two points above or below the previous 
day's closing price. Variable limits are also the same as for T-bond fu­
tures, currently three points, or $3,000. These variable limits establish 
a larger range of possible price movements whsn the price of the option 
has closed up or down the limit for three consecutive days in three or 
more contract months during a business year. 
The buyer of a T-bond futures option may exercise the option on any 
business day prior to expiration by giving notice to the Clearing Corpor­
ation of the Board of Trade by 8:00 p.m. The Clearing Corporation then 
assigns the notice to an option seller. The seller of the option does not 
know prior to notice whether the option will be exercised. If an option 
is exercised, the Clearing Corporation establishes a futures position for 
each buyer who has exercised the option and an opposite futures position 
for the seller who is given notice of exercise. The positions are estab­
lished at the exercise price of the option before opening of trading on. 
the following business day. If a call option with an exercise price of 
62 is exercised, the holder of the option purchases the futures contract 
at 62 and the options writer sells the futures contract at the same price. 
16 
T-bond futures options cease trading on the Friday preceding by at least 
five business days the first notice day for the corresponding T-bond fu­
tures contract. For the June, 1984, futures contract, the first notice 
day was May 31, 1984, the last trading day for options on this contract 
was ffey 18, and the expiration date for options was May 19. The date of 
expiration for unexercised options is the first Saturday following the 
last day of trading. 
Unlike T-bond futures contracts, there are no margin requirements 
for purchasers of futures options, because the buyer's risk is limited to 
the amount paid for the option premium. Writers of both put and call op­
tions must post performance margins. Minimum performance margins are es­
tablished by the Board of Trade, and brokerage firms often require margin 
deposits which exceed these minimums. Writers of options are also sub­
ject to maintenance margins in addition to the initial performance margin. 
Both writers and buyers of T-bond futures options must pay commission 
charges to brokerage firms which trade these contracts and these fees are 
established by trading firms. 
The Size of the Treasury Bond Futures Options Market 
Since the inception of trading in T-bond futures options in October, 
1982, there has been a rapid and sustained growth in the volume of trading 
and the number of contracts outstanding. Although options are currently 
traded for only three T-bond futures contracts, the number of call options 
outstanding is approaching the total open interest on all T-bond futures 
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contracts.5 On July 14, 1983, open interest on both types of options was 
62,887, by November 16, 1983, the number of outstanding contracts reached 
92,476, and by June 20, 1984, the combined open interest was 264,614 con­
tracts. In less than one year, the outstanding contracts more than quad­
rupled. By June, 1984, total open interest on options contracts exceeded 
the number of T-bond futures contracts outstanding. 
Daily trading of options has also increased quite rapidly. On July 
14, 1983, the total volume of contracts traded was 12,031; on November 16, 
1983, a new record volume of trades was set of 19,890 trades; and the vol­
ume for June 20, 1984, was 23,127 contracts (see Table 2-3 for data on the 
June 20, 1984, futures). 
Thus, the T-bond futures option market has become quite liquid, at 
least for futures contracts with maturities up to nine months." Trading in 
call options has consistently been greater than for put options, both in 
terms of the daily volume of trades and in the nunber of contracts out­
standing. The volume of trading in calls on June 19, 1984, was 1.77 times 
as large as for puts, and, on June 20, the open interest for calls was 
1.85 times as large as for puts. 
^On June 20, 1984, there were futures contracts traded for eleven dif­
ferent maturity dates from June, 1984, through December, 1968. Options 
were traded on only the first three of these contracts — September and 
December, 1984, and March, 1985. 
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CHAPTER III. HEDGING AND OPTIONS THEORY 
In this chapter, the theory of hedging and of options pricing will be 
developed. In the first section, the theoretical foundations of hedging 
theory will be presented. Recent studies incorporating the use of finan­
cial futures in hedging theory will also be analyzed. The applicability 
of the theory to hedging cash positions in long-term mortgages will be as­
sessed. The second section will cover the theoretical development of 
pricing of options on futures contracts. The first part of this section 
will consist of the development of the theory of call options pricing and 
the second part will be concerned with put options pricing. 
In the third section, alternative hedging strategies which involve 
either the use of financial futures, options on financial futures, or com­
binations of financial futures and options on these futures will be con­
structed. Discussion of the major empirical studies which have evaluated 
the effectiveness of alternative strategies will be presented in the last 
section. These strategies will also be assessed in terms of their appli­
cability to the present study. 
The Theory of Hedging 
One of the major reasons for the existence of futures markets, if not 
the primary one, is that they facilitate hedging. It is possible to hedge 
using forward contracts, but organized futures markets provide a means for 
easily hedging by providing standardized contracts which are guaranteed by 
the futures exchange rather than the individual contracting parties. As 
Working (1962, pp. 434-436) points out, futures markets were traditionally 
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viewed as essentially speculative markets. Their usefulness in hedging 
was regarded as a useful by-product. It has only been in the last thirty 
years that the importance of hedging to the existence of futures markets 
has been recognized. 
Hedging is done by a variety of individuals for a variety of reasons 
which differ according to the circumstances of the hedger. Consequently, 
it is necessary to delineate the purposes for undertaking the hedge posi­
tion. An operational definition of hedging is that the hedge "is a tem­
porary substitute for a merchandising contract that is to be made later" 
(Working, 1962, p. 441). 
Working delineates a number of alternative types of hedges, three of 
which are important in applications to financial markets. Selective hedg­
ing is the hedging of comodity stocks, or cash financial instruments, 
under a practice of hedging or not hedging, according to price expecta­
tions. Because the cash instruments are hedged when a price decline is 
expected, the purpose of hedging is not risk avoidance in the strict 
sense, but avoidance of loss. The second type of hedge used in financial 
markets is pure risk-avoidance hedging, where a hedge is undertaken to 
avoid any change in the market value of the cash position. Although Work­
ing considered this type of hedge to be unimportant in modern business 
practice, the advent of pronounced movements in interest rates in the re­
cent past has increased its importance for a number of types of financial 
institutions. 
Anticipatory hedging differs from selective and pure risk-avoidance 
hedging in that the latter two are undertaken primarily to protect an 
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existing position in the cash market. An anticipatory hedge involves pro­
tecting a cash position that is expected to be taken in the future. For ex­
ample, a bank which plans to borrow funds in six months might sell futures 
contracts in an attempt to lock in its future borrowing rate. To the ex­
tent that interest rates and futures prices move inversely, an increase in 
the cost of borrowing caused by higher interest rates would be offset by 
the gain from purchasing the futures contract at a lower price than it was 
originally sold. 
The primary purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of 
hedging a position in the cash market. Consequently, the theory of an­
ticipatory hedging will not be developed. 
Traditional hedging theory emphasized the pure risk-avoidance poten­
tial of futures markets. It was argued that hedgers would take a position 
in the futures market equal to, but opposite of, their position in the 
cash market.^ Thus, the hedger would hedge a cash position with a futures 
position of equal magnitude but of opposite sign. Traditional hedging 
theory arguments were based on the assumption that cash and futures instru­
ments' prices generally move together; thus, the gain or loss on the hedged 
position would be less than for an unhedged position. 
If the cash instrument's price at times t^ and tg, respectively, is 
and Mg, and the futures instrument's price at these times is and Fg, 
respectively, where tg> t^, the value of the gains or losses from the un­
hedged and hedged positions are, respectively: 
^The material on the traditional theory of hedging is based on Eder-
ington's 1979 article. 
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U = X^CMg-Mj) 




U = return on the unhedged position 
H = return on the hedged position, 
Xj^j = size of the cash position. 
Since the cash position would be hedged by a short sale of the futures 
contract, the return on the futures position would be the difference be­
tween the futures price at the time it is lifted and its initial price. 
If the prices'of the cash and futures instruments move together, the 
variance on the hedged position would be less than on the unhedged posi­
tion, and the risk measured in terms of the variability of the return 
would be decreased. The risk reduction potential is often discussed in 
terms of the basis, which is defined as the difference between the prices 
of the futures and cash instruments at each time t, or F^-M^. Letting = 
F^-M^ be the basis at time t, equation (3-2) can be rewritten as: 
Traditional hedging was based on the argument that changes in the basis 
were quite small relative to the prices of the instruments because of the 
possibility of making or taking delivery of the coimrodity. 
Working (1953) criticized the pure risk-minimization assumption of 
the traditional hedging theory. He argued that hedging was undertaken pri-
iririly to maximize profits. Hedgers were viewed as taking positions in the 
futures market depending on their expectations of changes in cash-futures 
price relationships. Thus, a holder of a long cash position would hedge by 
H = -XMtXFg-Mg) - (F^-M^)] = -X„AB. (3-3) 
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selling futures contracts only if the basis was expected to narrow, and 
2 
would not hedge if it was expected to widen. Despite the fact that Work­
ing's original article was published more than thirty years ago, many arti­
cles on hedging either ignore the possibility that there can be substan­
tial changes in the basis or include only a disclaimer that these changes 
might occur and consequently result in a return which is different from 
3 the hypothesized return. 
Changes in the basis can be especially important when a cross-hedge 
is being undertaken. A cross-hedge is one for which the futures contract 
instrument is different than the cash instrument. In the present study » 
only cross-hedges are considered since the cash instrument is outstanding 
mortgage loans and there is no futures contract traded on any mortgage 
contract. In this instance, the possibility of a change in the basis over 
the hedging period is of special significance. 
Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961) applied basic portfolio theory to 
the theory of hedging. This application resulted in incorporating the risk 
minimization of the traditional hedging theory and the maximization of ex­
pected profit theory of hedging developed by Working into a unified theory 
of hedging. A nuirter of alternative measures of risk might be used. Mea­
sures of risk which focus on the disutility aspects of uncertainty are the 
p 
The relationship between the change in the basis and the return on 
the hedged position is 3H/3AB = -X» from equation (3-3). Since XM>0, the 
return is inversely related to the change in the basis. If the basis is 
expected to narrow, or E(AB)<0, there would be an expected gain on the 
hedged position and the hedge would be undertaken. The opposite is true 
if the basis is expected to widen. 
O 
Among these are articles in exchange, brokerage house, and trade 
publications. 
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probability of loss, the expected value of loss, and the variance of the 
expected return. The measure used in this study is the variance of the 
expected return. 
One difference between basic portfolio theory and the portfolio model 
of hedging is that the cash and futures holdings are not considered to be 
substitutes in the portfolio model of hedging. Additionally, since cash 
holdings are assumed to be predetermined, any interest receipts on the 
cash instrument(s) holdings may also be considered to be given and, thus, 
have no effect on the analysis. 
A seminal article on the portfolio approach to hedging was written by 
Ederington (1979). Ederington assumed, as did Johnson and Stein, that 
only one cash market instrument was being hedged. This assumption also 
holds in the present study. The derivation of the optimal proportion of 
the cash instrument to be hedged used in this study follows from Edering­
ton' s work. 
Defining the return on the unhedged position, as in equation (3-1), 
its expected value and variance are: 
E(U) = Xj^. E(M2-M^), and (3-4) 
Var(U) = x/ a/ (3-5) 
2 
where is the subjective variance of the cash instrument and E is the 
expectations operator. 
If R represents the return on the hedged position which contains cash 
and futures instrument holdings of Xj^ and Xp, respectively, the expected 
return and variance of the hedged position are; 
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E(R) = X„ . E(M2-Mj)  + Xp • EfFg-Fi) -  K(Xp) (3-6) 
Var(R) = x/ aM^ + Xp^aF? + ZX^pC^p, (3-7) 
where K(Xp) represents brokerage and other costs of undertaking futures 
2 2 transactions, including the cost of providing margin, and , ap and Cj^jp 
represent the subjective variance and covariance of the possible price 
changes between periods one and two. 
The cash position may be completely hedged or unhedged. There is no 
a priori assumption concerning the extent to which the cash position is 
hedged. In the traditional theory, it was assumed that Xp = -X^^, and 
Working assumed that Xp = -X^|, or zero, depending on the expected change 
in the basis. It is possible that Xj^ and Xp have the same sign, which 
would mean that a long (short) position in the cash market is hedged by 
taking a long (short) position in the futures market. 
Let n = -Xp/X^ represent the proportion of the cash position which is 
hedged. If a long cash position is hedged by taking a short position in 
the futures market, X^ and Xp would have opposite signs and n would be 
positive; i.e., a short sale of the futures contract would be indicated by 
a negative value. The value of n is the number of futures contracts 
traded for each unit of the cash instrument held. 
Substituting n into equations (3-6) and (3-7) gives 
E(R) = X„. E(M2-M^) - nX^' EXEg-F^) - K(Xj^,n) 
= XJ^ [E(M2-M^) - n • EXFg-Fi)] - K(X,^,n) (3-8) 
Var(R) = x/ + n^X^^ a p^ - 2nX^^ a ^p^ 
= X„2(cj^Vap2 - 2n a^p). (3-9) 
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Letting the expected change in basis be E(AB) = [[(Fg-Mg) - the 
expected return on the hedged position is 
E(R) = X„[(l-n) .  E(AM) - nE(AB)] -  (3-10) 
where E(AM) = ECMG-M^^) is the expected change in the price of one unit of 
the cash instrument. 
If the expected change in the basis is zero, the expected gain or 
loss is reduced as n approaches one, as in the traditional theory. It can 
also be seen that changes in the basis can add to, or reduce, the return 
that would have been expected on the unhedged position where E(U) = 
Because the size of the holding of the cash instrument is assumed to 
be constant, the effect of a change in the proportion of the cash position 
hedged on the variance of the return is 
4^^  = (3-11) 
and the risk minimizing hedge ratio is 
n* = ' (3-12) 
There is no a priori restriction on the sign of n*. If the prices of 
the cash and futures instruments move in opposite directions < 0, the 
risk minimizing hedger would then take the same position in both markets, 
i.e., a holder of a cash position would take a long position in the fu­
tures market. If n*>l, each unit of the cash instrument would be hedged 
with a short position of more than one futures contract. The only case 
for which the one-to-one hedge ratio of the traditional theory would be 
optimal would be when cash and futures price movements are equal. 
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A measure of the effectiveness of the hedge can also be derived using 
the portfolio approach. If the effectiveness of the hedge is defined as 
the risk reduction potential of the position, one can determine its effec­
tiveness by comparing the risk on the unhedged position with the minimum 
risk that can be obtained on the hedged position. The measure of hedging 
effectiveness used in this study is 
where Var(R*) represents the minimum variance of the hedged position. 
Substituting equation (3-12) for the risk minimizing hedge ratio into 
equation (3-9) gives 
Var(R*) = (c^ ^ 
= (3-14) 
Substituting (3-14) into equation (3-13) yields 
8=1 - ^ ^ (3-15) 
which is the population coefficient of determination between the change in 
the cash instrument's price and the change in the future's price. If the 
hedge is perfect, or Var(R*) is zero, the value of e will be one. As the 
percentage variation in the hedged position is reduced, e increases. Thus, 
e measures the percentage reduction in risk resulting from the hedge.^ 
^Regressing the change in the cash instruments' price on the future's 
price provides an estimate of the risk minimizing hedge ratio n*, since 
n* = SMF/S^P, where S|^ and S2p are the sample covariance of the changes 
in the cash and futures prices and the variance of the change in the fu­
tures price, respectively. The effectiveness of the hedge is estimated 
by the sample coefficient of determination 
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Options Pricing Theory 
The theoretical foundation of the theory of pricing of options on 
futures contracts is derived from option pricing models for corporate 
stocks. The futures option pricing model used in this study was developed 
by Black (1976) and is based on the Black-Scholes (1973) stock option 
pricing model. In the Black model, the price of a call option which can 
only be exercised at maturity (a European option) is derived from the as­
sumption that a riskless hedged position consisting of a short position in 
the futures contract and a long position in the futures option can be 
created.^ 
The major assumptions of the Black model are: 
(i) The markets for futures and options are fiction less; e.g., 
there are no restrictions on short sales, no transactions 
costs and no taxes; 
(ii) The risk-free rate of interest is known and constant over 
the life of the option; 
(iii) The fractional change in the futures price over any inter­
val is distributed log-normally with a known variance rate 
2 
equal to o which is constant over the life of the option; 
(iv) The option is "European;" that is, it can only be exercised 
at maturity. 
^This section is based on Black and Scholes (1973), Black (1976-), and 
Jarrow and Rudd (1983). 
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The terras used in the derivation are: 
C = Value of the call option; 
F = Price of the futures contract; 
E = Exercise price of the call option; 
r = Riski ess rate of interest; 
2 
a = Variance rate of the fractional change in the futures price; 
t = Time; 
T = Time of expiration of the option. 
Under these assumptions, the value of the option will depend only on 
the price of the futures contract, on the time to expiration, and on vari­
ables that can be taken to be known constants. It is then possible to 
create a hedged position consisting of a long position in the option and a 
short position- in the futures contract whose value will depend only on 
time and the values of known constants, but not on the price of the fu­
tures contract. In order for the hedge to be riskless, the hedger must be 
able to adjust the position continuously changing the ratio of options to 
futures held. The value of the option expressed as a function of the fu­
tures price F and time t is C(F,t). The nunter of options which must be 
sold short against one futures contract held is Since futures 
®The Black model assumes that the hedge can be continuously adjusted 
at zero cost. In order for the hedge to be riskless, the change in the 
value of the position must be zero; thus, the hedge ratio is H = aC/aF, 
since an instantaneous unit change in the stock price causes a change in 
the price of the call option of this magnitude. There is no theoretical 
justification for assuming that H is constant at alternative values of F, 
so, as the price of the stock changes, the hedge ratio must be adjusted to 
keep H equal to aC/aF. 
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contracts are settled daily with gains being added to the trader's account 
and losses deducted from his/her account, the value of the futures con­
tract is reset to zero each day. The value of the equity of the hedged 
position is then just the value of the option. 
The change in the value of the hedged position over the time interval 
At is 
AC-3C/9F. AF. (3-16) 
Assuming that the short position can be continuously adjusted, stochastic 
calculus can be used to expand AC, which is C(F + AF, t+At) - C(F,t) as 
fol1ows: 
A C  = § •  f2 At it. (3-17) 
Substituting from equation (3-17) into (3-16), the change in the value of 
the hedged position is: 
AC - 1^ . AF = 1^  • AF + -  ^WIL * + | | .  At - 1^  AF 
= Y WW * ^ 'At. (3-18) 
Since the change in the value of the equity must equal the value of 
the equity times rAt for a riskless hedge, we have: 
(5-") 
. Cancelling out At from each side of this equation and solving for 
3C/3t gives the differential equation 
(3-20) 
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At the time of expiration, the value of the call option on the fu­
tures contract is the difference between the price of the futures contract 
at this time and the option's exercise price if the difference is positive. 
If the futures price is less than the exercise price at expiration, the 
call option will have a value of zero. If the futures price is greater 
than the exercise price, the holder of the option could purchase the fu­
tures contract at a price below its current market price resulting in a 
gain. If the futures price were less than the exercise price, the holder 
would allow the option to expire unexercised; thus, its value would be 
zero. This relationship can be written as: 
C(F,T) = F-p-E, Fy> E 
= 0 , Fy<E. (3-21) 
Equation (3-21) is the main boundary condition for the value of the 
call option.^ Solving equations (3-20) and (3-21) for C gives the formula 
for the value of a call option on a futures contract, which is: 
C(F,t) = e"'^^ [F-N{dj) - E-Ntdg)]. (3-22) 
where d^ = [ln(F/E) + 1/2 • A^T]/A/r~ ; 
dg = Cln(F/E) - 1/2 • a^Tl/a/r" = dj- o/T ; 
T = (T-t), which is the time to expiration; 
N(d^) is the cumulative normal density function for d^. 
The price of the call option then depends on its time to maturity, its 
exercise price, the riskless rate of interest, and the futures price and 
second boundary condition necessary to make the solution to equa­
tions (3-20) and (3-21) unique is that C(0,t) = 0. 
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the variance rate of the fractional change in this price, or the volatili­
ty of the futures contract's price. 
The Black model was derived under the assumption that the call option 
is a European option, which does not have an early exercise right. There 
has been a debate in the stock options literature on the early exercise 
right for American options. Jarrow and Rudd (1983, p. 63) demonstrated 
that American options on nondividend-paying securities will never be ex­
ercised early. Since there are no dividends paid on future contracts, the 
early exercise right does not increase the value of the option. 
The implications of this model can be examined by evaluating the ef­
fects of a change in the value of each of the model's parameters on the 
O 
option's price. The partial derivatives of the call price for changes of 
each of the parameters are: 
= e"''^ • N(d^) > 0 (3-23) 
= _e-rT. Nfdg) < 0 (3-24) 
-gp = -Te-rT[F'N(d;) - E-N(d2)] < 0 (3-25) 
II = e"^^T-F-N'(d^) > 0 (3-26) 
|C ^ Te ^ F-g + e-r^ErNfdg) = 0, (3-27) 
where N'(d-,) = ^ 
®For the derivation of the effects of changes in each of the model's 
parameters on the value of a call option on a corporate stock, see Jarrow 
and Rudd (1983), pages 119-120. The derivations in this section are based 
on Jarrow and Rudd's work with the necessary modifications to account for 
the difference between stock and futures options. Goodman (1983) 
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For a call option, the effect of a change in the futures price on the 
option's price is unambiguous. As is derived in equation (3-23), the 
value of the call option increases when the futures price increases, be­
cause the intrinsic value of the option increases when the futures price 
increases. The higher (lower) is the exercise price E of the option, the 
smaller (larger) is the value of the option, as should be obvious, because 
the buyer is paying for the right to purchase the futures instrument at a 
higher price; consequently, the right is worth less. 
The effect of a change in interest rates on the option's price is not 
as obvious as in the previous two cases. To understand this effect, con­
sider a riskless world. The option buyer would be paying an amount equal 
to the present discounted value of the difference between the value of the 
futures contract at expiration and the option's exercise price. An in­
crease in the riskless rate of interest would cause this present value, 
which is the price of the option, to decline. However, since the futures 
price at the option's expiration date and the exercise price are expected 
to be fairly close, interest rate changes have only a slight effect on the 
price of the option. This derivation assumes that the price of the futures 
contract is unaffected by changes in the riskless rate of interest, or 
3F/ar = 0. Substantial movements in the prices of debt instruments will 
occur because of changes in interest rates. As a rule, interest rate in­
creases will cause a fall in the price of futures contracts whose under­
lying instrument is a débt. instrument, such as Treasury bond futures. This 
discusses the effects of changesin the model's parameters on the price of 
a futures option but does not derive them mathematically. 
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effect will reinforce the negative effect of the riskless interest rate on 
the opportunity cost of the call premium. 
The parameter a measures the volatility of the futures price. As the 
futures contract price becomes more volatile, the value of the call option 
increases. This is because a call option has no downside risk, since, no 
matter how low the futures price falls, the option's minimum value is zero, 
and increasing volatility increases the probability that the futures price 
will be greater than the exercise price at expiration of the option. An 
increase in the probability that the option will be in-the-money causes an 
increase in the value of a call option. 
For a call option, an increase in the time to expiration decreases the 
present value of the difference between the futures price and the exercise 
price paid by the purchaser at the time of expiration. This causes a 
decrease in the value of the call option. However, increasing the time to 
maturity of the option increases the likelihood of favorable outcomes for 
the buyer of the option. Hence, since the two effects are opposite in influ­
ence, the effect of a change in the time to expiration of the call option is 
ambiguous. 
The valuation of a European put option follows directly from the 
Black formula for a call option and the application of the put-call parity 
equation. The value of a put option on a futures contract is: 
P = C-e"" • (F-E), .(3-28) 
where P is the price of the put option. 
The derivation of the put option price is based on the analysis of 
the cash flows from the arbitrage portfolio. Assume that a portfolio is 
constructed consisting of writing a call option, purchasing a put option. 
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and purchasing the futures contract at time t. Further, assume that all 
of the instruments in the portfolio have the same expiration date, the put 
and call options have the same exercise price, and that all the assump­
tions of the Black call option model hold. Let the prices of the put and 
call options at time t be P.). and C^j., respectively, the exercise price for 
the options be E, and the prices of the futures contract at the initiation 
of hedge and at expiration of the contracts be and Fj, respectively. 
The cash flows from the arbitrage portfolio are given in Table 3-1-
In order to derive these cash flows, first consider the call option. This 
option will be exercised only if the futures price at T is greater than 
the option's exercise price, or Fj>E; so, the loss to the writer of the op­
tion is Fy-E, or zero, whichever is greater. The lower bound of zero oc­
curs when Fj<E and the option expires unexercised. When the option is ex­
ercised, the writer of the call option would offset his/her position by 
delivering the futures contract which was purchased at time t. The put 
option would be exercised only if the futures price is less than the exer­
cise price at expiration, or when Fy<E, so the gain on the option would be 
E-Fy or zero. When the put is exercised, the purchaser of the put would 
deliver the futures contract which was initially purchased. If Fj>E, the 
put option would expire unexercised. 
It can be seen from Table 3-1 that the cash flow at the expiration of 
the hedge does not depend on whether the futures price is greater, or less, 
than the exercise price of the options. The value of the arbitrage port­
folio at the options' expiration is known at the initiation of the position 
because both the exercise price E and the purchase price of the futures 
contract F^ are known. 
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Table 3-1. Cash flows from the arbitrage portfolio 
Position Opening transaction Closing transaction 
Fy>E Fy<E 
Write a call C^ E-Fj 0 
Buy a put -P^ 0 E-Fj 
Buy a futures contract 0 Fy-F^ Fy-F^ 
Total C^-Pt E-F^ E-F^ 
The initial value of the arbitrage portfolio must be equal to zero if 
there are no riskless profits to be made, so, the present discounted value 
of the cash flows must be zero. Letting r equal the riskless rate of in­
terest and T-t be the time to expiration of the option, the present dis­
counted value of the cash flow is: 
0 = CT-PT + E-RT(E-FT), (3-29) 
which, through rearrangement of terms and dropping of the time subscript, 
is the put-call parity equation of (3-28). 
The put-call parity equation can then be used to solve for the price 
of a put option on the same futures contract and with the same exercise 
price and expiration date as the call option by using the Black call op­
tion model and the parameters r and T of the call option model. 
The effect of a change in any of the parameters of the model on the 
put option price can be derived from the impact on the call option price 
and the put-call parity equation. A change in the price of the underlying 
futures contract will cause an inverse change in the price of the put 
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option. An increase (decrease) in the futures price will mean that the 
buyer of the put option will have to pay a higher (lower) price to pur­
chase the contract in order to offset the sale of the contract (the ini­
tial put). A higher (lower) exercise price will cause the price of the 
put option to increase (decrease). A higher (lower) exercise price gives 
the buyer of the put the right to sell the option at a higher (lower) 
price. Thus, the value of this right will increase (decrease) with an 
increase (decrease) in the exercise price. 
The value of a put option will decrease (increase) when the rate of 
interest increases (decreases). There are two effects on the value of 
the put when the rate of interest changes. The first effect is the change 
in the call price which is always negative, and the second is the effect 
on the present value of the difference between the futures price and the 
exercise price. If the futures price is less than the put's exercise 
price, a decrease (an increase) in the rate of interest will cause a de­
crease (an increase) in the present value of this difference, and this 
will reinforce the negative effect on the put's price from a change in the 
call option's price. If the futures price is greater than the exercise 
price of the put option, the effect on the put's prices is less obvious. 
In this case, an increase in the risk-free rate of interest will cause the 
value of the term [-er^^(F-E)] to increase, but this will never be large 
enough to offset the decline in the put price caused by a decline in the 
call option's price. Thus, there is an inverse relationship between the 
risk-free rate of interest and the price of a put option. It is assumed 
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in this derivation that the price of the futures contract is independent 
of the risk-free rate of interest (3F/3r = 0). 
As is the case for the price of a call option, a change in the vola­
tility of the futures price (measured by (T) will cause the put option's 
price to change in the same direction. This is because there is no down­
side risk on the option, and, consequently, an increase (a decrease) in 
the volatility will increase (decrease) the probability that the futures 
price will be less than the exercise price at the expiration of the option 
contract. An increase (a decrease) in the probability that the put option 
will be in-the-money will cause an increase (a decrease) in the value of 
the option. 
A change in the time to expiration of the put option will have two 
effects on its value. Increasing (decreasing) the time to expiration will 
decrease (increase) the present discounted value of the difference between 
the exercise price and the futures price, if positive. However, increasing 
(decreasing) the time to expiration increases (decreases) the likelihood 
of a favorable outcome. Hence, as the time to expiration changes, the ef­
fect on the put's value will depend on the relative magnitude of these ef­
fects. 
Hedging with Futures and Futures Options 
In this section, a number of alternative strategies which can be used 
to hedge a cash position are presented. These strategies involve using 
financial futures contracts, options on these futures contracts, and com­
binations of futures and options contracts. Additionally, a strategy of 
using futures contracts and stop orders on the contracts will also be 
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evaluated. It will be assumed throughout the analysis that the strategies 
consist of equal size futures and option positions. For example, if the 
two alternative strategies being considered are selling futures contracts 
or buying put options on futures contracts, the nuntier of futures contracts 
sold will be assumed to be equal to the number of put options purchased. 
It is a straightforward extension of the present analysis to evaluate the 
results of strategies which use alternative futures/options weighting sys­
tems. It will also be assumed that the hedging position will be weighted 
by the risk minimizing hedge ratio n* derived previously in this chapter. 
If put options on futures contracts are the hedging instrument, for each 
unit of the cash instrument held, n* units of put options will be pur­
chased. 
The alternative hedging strategies evaluated are: selling futures 
contracts, selling futures contracts and simultaneously purchasing call op­
tions on the same futures contracts, purchasing put options on futures 
contracts, and selling futures contracts and placing stop orders on these 
contracts. 
The return to an unhedged position in the cash instrument was given 
in equation (3-1) as U = where the subscripts t and T represent 
the times at which the hedge is initiated and lifted, respectively. The 
risk minimizing hedge ratio derived in equation (3-12), n* = results 
in an expected return on the hedged portfolio of: 
E(R) = E[X„(AM-n* F)] = E[Xf^(AM-AM/AF.AF)] = 0, 
where AM = My-M^ and 
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The return on the hedged portfolio using futures contracts is pre­
sented in Figure 3-1, where the initial futures price is F^ and its price 
when the hedge is lifted is Fj. The curve for the return on the cash hold­
ing is weighted by 1/n* in order to make the analysis consistent; i.e., the 
return is for 1/n* units of the cash instrument and one unit of the fu­
tures instrument. In the figure, the slopes of the return lines will be 
of equal absolute size, since, for each one unit change in the price of 
the futures contract, the value of 1/n* units of the cash instrument will 
be n*'l/n* = 1. The return on the sale of a futures contract is positive 
when Fy<F^, because the seller of the contract can repurchase it at a 
lower price than its initial selling price. 
Return Cash instrument 
Futures sale (F.-F^) 
Figure 3-1. Return from cash and futures position 
The total return for the hedged position is then zero at each alterna­
tive price of the futures contract. It has been implicitly assumed that 
n*>0 in this derivation, so that a cash position is hedged with a short 
position in the futures instrument. 
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An advantage of using futures options as hedging instruments is that 
the downside risk of a movement in the cash instrument's price is elimi­
nated while the upside risk, or a favorable movement, is not eliminated. 
The purchase of an option can be considered to be a form of insurance, a 
favorable cash instrument price movement will result in a gain, while an 
unfavorable movement is insured against by holding the option. For exam­
ple, a strategy of buying a futures contract and purchasing a put option 
on this contract at an exercise price equal to the purchase price of the 
futures contract will eliminate the possibility of a loss from holding the 
futures contract. If the price of the futures contract were to fall, the 
potential loss on the contract could be offset by exercising the put, thus 
selling the futures contract at its initial purchase price. The price 
paid for the put option, or the option's premium, is the price paid for 
the insurance against loss. 
A hedge which incorporates the use of futures options is the sale of 
a futures contract and the simultaneous purchase of a call option on the 
contract. The cash instrument is then hedged by a futures/options posi­
tion. Assume that the exercise price of the call option is equal to the 
initial (selling) price of the futures contract and one call option is 
purchased for each futures contract sold. The return from this strategy 
is illustrated in Figure 3-2. C^, as previously defined, is the price of 
one call option. Since the option is purchased, has a negative value 
for the return on the option. 
The return from the futures sale is F^-Fy, where Fj, as before, is 
the price of the futures contract at the time the position is lifted. If 
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Call Purchase Return 
Combined 
return 
Futures Sale (F.-F_) 
Figure 3-2. Return from a futures sale and call option purchase 
the price of the futures contract at this time is greater than the exercise 
price of the option, the option would be exercised and the futures contract 
repurchased at the exercise price of E; thus, if Fj>F^, the return is 
F^-E-C^. If the closing futures price is less than the option's exercise 
price, the position would be closed out by repurchasing the futures con­
tract at Fy and allowing the option to expire unexercised. The return 
from the futures/options position is then: 
Rl = Ft-E-Ct, Fy>E 
= F^-Fy-C, Fy<E. (3-31) 
Since it is assumed that the exercise price of the option is equal to 
the initial futures price, the minimum return on this position is -C^, or 
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the price of the call option.9 Equation (3-31) is also the return to the 
futures/options position when the initial futures price and the option's 
call price are not equal because the option would only be exercised if the 
closing futures price were greater than the option's exercise price. 
The sell futures/buy call options strategy can be replicated by an 
options only strategy. In this case, the strategy would be to purchase 
put options on the futures contract. Again, assume that the exercise 
price of the put option on the futures contract equals the initial price 
of the futures contract. If the futures price at the end of the hedge 
period is greater than the options exercise price, or Fy>E, the option will 
not be exercised, because the selling price E is less than the repurchase 
price Fy, thus resulting in a loss. If Fj<E, the option would be exer­
cised resulting in a gain of E-Fj-P. Because it is assumed that the ini­
tial futures price and the option's exercise price are equal, the return 
to the put option purchase is: 
Assume that the initial price of the futures contract is 70, one fu­
tures contract is sold at this price, and one futures call option with an 
exercise price of 70 is purchased at a price of 3. If the futures price 
at the end of the hedging period were 75, the option would be exercised 
(Fj>E) and the return on the position would be F^-E-C^ = -C^ = 70-70-3=-3. 
If the futures price were to fall to 65, the call option would not be 
exercised; instead, the position would be closed out by purchasing the fu­
tures contract at this price. In this case, the return on the position 
would be Ft-Fy-Ct " 70-65-3 = 2. It is also obvious that, as the futures 
price at the termination of the hedged period decreases, the return to the 
position increases; i.e., if Fj = 60, the return is 70-60-3 = 7. The op­
tions price of 3 is the price paid to eliminate the possibility of loss on 
the short sale of futures contract. 
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= E-Fy-P^ ,Fy < E, (3-32) 
where is the price of the put option. Equation (3-32) holds no matter 
what the initial futures price is, because there is no initial futures 
market transaction.^^ 
The return from the sale of a put option on a futures contract is il­
lustrated in Figure 3-3. Comparing Figures 3-2 and 3-3, it is apparent 
that the sell futures/buy calls strategy is replicated by the purchase of 
put options if the exercise prices of the call and put options contracts 
are equal. The returns from these two strategies under the assumption of 
equal exercise prices will differ only by the difference between the prices 
8f the put and call options, or P^-C^. 
Assume that the same numerical values hold as in the example of 
footnote eleven where F* = 70 and E = 70. Also, assume that the put op­
tion's price is 3. If the price of the futures contract at the termina­
tion of the hedge is 75, the option would not be exercised because, if it 
were, the holder of the option would sell the futures contract at 70 and 
close out the position by repurchasing the contract for 75. Thus, when 
Fj = 75, the option would not be exercised, and the return on the position 
would be the cost of purchasing the put, or -3. 
If the terminal futures price were 65, the holder of the option would 
exercise it, selling the futures contract at 70, repurchasing it at 65, 
and receiving a return of E-Fj-P-t = 70-65-3 = 2. The put options position 
is then exactly replicated by the futures sale/call options purchase po­
sition when the price of the put and call options are equal and they have 
the same exercise price. This can easily be seen by comparing this exam­
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Figure 3-3. Return from buying a put option 
The returns to hedging 1/n* units of the cash instrument alternative­
ly with the purchase of a put option on a futures contract, or the sale of 
a futures contract and the purchase of a call option on the same contract 
can be derived using the relationships for each strategy. Assume that the 
prices of the put and call options are equal, or C^=P^> and that the exer­
cise prices of the options are also equal. The return to the cash instru­
ment hedged with either a put option or a call option and a futures sale 
is: 
R3 = • AM-AF-Pt - -Pf 
where P^ = C^, AM = and AF = Fy-F^. 








Figure 3-4. Return from hedging with put option or call 
option/futures sale 
Figure 3-4 and equation (3-33) provide evidence of the advantage of 
using options in the hedging strategy. When a cash position is hedged 
with the sale of a futures contract, assuming n*>0, both the possibility 
of a loss and of a gain is reduced. Using options in the hedging position 
reduces the possibility of a loss when the cash instrument's price falls, 
but does not eliminate the possibility of a gain when the cash instrument's 
price rises. The price paid for the possibility of the gain is the op­
tion's price, or its premium. 
The final hedging strategy considered in this study involves using 
futures contracts and stop orders on these contracts. Because they are 
most commonly used to limit potential losses, the stop orders are gener­
ally referred to as stop loss orders. A stop loss order establishes the 
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maximum loss that a holder of a position is willing to incur. If the 
holder of a short position for one T-bond futures contract initially sells 
the contract for 75, or $75,000, and places a stop order at 78, the posi­
tion will be offset if the futures price reaches this point at any time. 
Thus, the holder has limited his/her potential loss to $3,000, since the 
futures contract would be purchased for $78,000.^^ 
The holder of a cash instrument could then elect to hedge the posi­
tion by selling futures contracts and placing stop orders on the con­
tracts. Since the futures contracts are sold, the stop orders would be 
placed at a price higher than the original futures selling price. The 
price at which a stop order is placed will depend on the maximum loss the 
hedger is willing to incur on a futures transaction. The advantage of 
using this strategy instead of a straight sale of the futures contract is 
that favorable movements of the cash instrument's price are not offset by 
unfavorable movements of the futures contract's price except for the dif­
ference betv/een the price at which the stop order is executed and the ori-
12 ginal selling price of the contract. Unfavorable movements of the cash 
^^Loosigian (1980) provides an analysis of the use of stop orders 
for alternative futures transactions on pages 117-123. 
I P  Assume that n*=l/2, two units of the cash instrument are purchased 
at time t for Mt=60 per unit, and are hedged by selling one futures con­
tract at FT=70. A stop order is placed on the futures contract at a 
price of FL=73. If the cash instrument's price increases to 62 and the 
futures price increases to 74 at time t+i <T, the return on the position 
would be: 
1/n* -(Mt+i-Mt) + = 2(62-60) - (70-73) = 1. 
If the price of the cash and futures instruments would decline to 58 and 
66, respectively, the return would be 2(58-60) + (70-66) = 0. 
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instrument's price are still protected against by the hedge when the stop 
order is not executed. 
The futures sale/stop order strategy is an alternative to either the 
futures/call options or put options strategies discussed above, in that 
the strategy limits the loss on unfavorable cash instrument price move­
ments, but not the gain on favorable cash instrument price movements. 
The advantage of using stop orders instead of futures options is that 
there is no cost involved in executing the order because the fees for the 
futures transactions are charged on a roundturn basis. The cost of using 
options on the hedging position is the price paid for the put or call op­
tion. 
There is, however, a potentially serious disadvantage in using stop 
orders because the orders could be executed when, in retrospect, they 
should not have been. Suppose that a hedge is initiated by selling fu­
tures contracts and placing stop orders on the contracts. During the 
period the cash and futures instruments' prices increase sufficiently so 
that the stop orders are executed, but these prices subsequently fall 
during the hedge period. The loss on the cash instrument consequently is 
not offset by a gain on the futures contracts, but is increased by the 
13 loss on the futures contracts. The use of stop orders then introduces 
1 ^  Using the initial values of the examples in footnote twelve, let 
the time t+i<T be = 61.5 and Ft+i = 73, The futures position would 
. then be closed out at this price. If the cash and futures prices subse­
quently fall and the cash price at the termination of the hedge is My=56, 
the return on the position would be: 
2(56-60) - (73-70) = -8-3 + -11. 
This would be a larger loss than would have been sustained on the unhedged 
position. 
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the possibility that the futures position will be offset when, ex post, 
it should not have been. 
Empirical Studies of Futures and Options 
Hedging Strategies 
A number of recent studies have empirically tested the effectiveness 
of various hedging strategies using futures contracts and/or options on 
futures contracts. Some of these have focused on the use of financial 
futures in hedging cash positions in mortgage loans, or positions in mort­
gage loan commitments which have not been taken down. Others have evalu­
ated the use of options in hedging cash positions. To this date, however, 
there have not been any empirical studies which evaluate both futures and 
futures options strategies for hedging mortgage loan positions. Those em­
pirical studies which are most directly applicable to the present analysis 
are discussed in this section. 
Ederington (1979) estimated the effectiveness of the GNMA COR and 
Treasury bills futures markets in reducing the risk associated with hold­
ing cash positions in these instruments and estimated the effect on ex­
pected returns for the hedged positions. Although this study did not di­
rectly apply the risk minimization analysis to mortgage lending nor to the 
use of options on futures, it is significant in that it was the first 
study to use the techniques employed in the present research. Ederington 
found that the risk minimizing hedge ratio and the efficiency of the hedge 
varied according to the length of the hedge and the maturity of the con­
tract used in the hedge. This was true for both hedges using the GNMA and 
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Treasury bills contracts. It was also true that longer hedges had greater 
efficiency than did short-term hedges. 
Starleaf and Langley (1983) estimated the risk minimizing hedge ratio 
and its effectiveness when the cash instrument was mortgage loans and the 
hedging instrument was either Treasury bond or GNMA CDR futures contracts. 
Three alternative hedge lengths were used — six, twelve, and eighteen 
months — and, in each case, the hedging instrument was the nearby futures 
contract.The estimates of the risk minimizing hedge ratio using the 
T-bond futures contract ranged from .596 to .680 and its effectiveness 
ranged from .46 to ,59. For each of the hedging periods selected, it was 
found that GNMA CDR futures contracts were a less effective instrument 
for hedging the cash instrument than were T-bond futures. 
Losey (1981) evaluated a strategy of hedging conventional mortgages 
using short positions in GNMA CDR futures. He assumed that conventional 
mortgages were originated on a continuing basis and were hedged on a quar­
terly basis using GNMA short positions in contracts with delivery dates one 
year from the date of initiation of the hedge. The position was then main­
tained for one year. Losey did not use a weighted hedge strategy; instead 
he analyzed the changes in the yields on conventional mortgage loans and 
GNMA CDRs. The justification for the use of changes in yields rather than 
changes in the instruments' prices was that the prices of seasoned 
l^It was assumed that the cash instrument being hedged was an eight 
percent, thirty-year, monthly payment mortgage which would be prepaid in 
the twelfth year. The reason this instrument was selected was that the 
mortgage price series was essentially the same as for the Treasury bond 
and GNMA CDR futures contracts. 
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mortgages are generally not available .15 Losey found that, for twelve of 
the thirteen quarterly hedge positions taken, the changes in yields on 
mortgages and GNMA CDR futures were in the same direction; however, the 
futures yield movement ranged from 34 to 268 percent of the cash market 
movement. Thus, on a yield basis, hedging of mortgages by GNMA CDR fu­
tures was found to provide a less than perfect hedge. 
Kolb, Corgel and Chiang (1982) developed a risk minimizing hedging 
strategy for mortgage loans based on duration analysis. The procedure 
used was based on the estimation of the price sensitivities of the hedged 
and hedging instruments, the authors argued that mortgage market partici­
pants are not always able to hedge an instrument with exactly the same 
characteristics as an instrument for which futures contracts are traded. 
This is because the risk, maturity, and coupon structures of the hedged 
and hedging instruments are generally mismatched. Because of this mis­
match, the optimal hedge ratio for risk minimization will depend on the 
sensitivities of the prices of the instruments to changes in the risk-free 
rate of interest. 
The optimal hedge ratio N is the number of futures contracts, j, used 
to hedge one unit of asset i, with the goal that, over the life of the 
hedge : 
AP^ + APj(N) = 0, (3-34) 
where P^ and Pj are the respective values of the instrument to be hedged 
^^The loan yield used in the analysis was the average contract rate 
on conventional mortgage loans originated by all major lenders for the 
purchase of previously occupied homes. For details of the data used in 
this study, see Table 1, page eleven, of this article. 
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and the futures contract used as the hedging instrument. The problem is 
then to select the number of futures contracts, N, to trade in order to 
offset differing interest rate sensitivities of i and j so that equation 
(3-34) holds. To find N, one must solve: 
BP, 3Pt 
+ (3-35) 
where Rp is one plus the risk-free interest rate. Using MacCauley's defi­
nition of duration, the authors found the risk-minimizing hedge ratio: 
R.P.-D. R./3Rr 
^ • RjPjDj * Rj/3Rp ' (3-36) 
where and Dj are the durations of instruments i and j, and R^j and Rj 
are one plus the yields of the respective instruments.^® 
Using monthly data for commercial mortgage commitments and GNMA COR 
future contracts as the hedged and hedging instruments, the authors found 
that SR^/SRj = .421, and used this value in conjunction with the durations 
of the instruments in equation (3-36) in generating various examples of 
hedged positions. The authors argued that their price sensitivity hedging 
strategy will substantially reduce hedging errors as compared to the naive 
hedging strategy of employing a one-to-one hedge ratio. 
^^MacCauley's measure of duration for asset k is: 
j t . 
D,. 
'k k 
where is the cash flow of asset k in the t^*^ time period, and R- is one 
plus the discount rate on the asset. 
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Merton, Scholes and Gladstein (1978 and 1982) used simulation tech­
niques to estimate the returns and risk of alternative investment strate­
gies with call and put options on corporate stocks. In the earlier arti­
cle, fully covered call option writing and a buying strategy which com­
bined the purchase of call options on corporate stocks and coimercial 
paper were evaluated. In the latter article, the risk-return distribu­
tions from uncovered put-writing and a put purchase strategy were esti­
mated using simulation methods. Although the authors did not evaluate 
strategies using options on Treasury bond futures or other futures con­
tracts, their research is relevant to the present study in that the op­
tions strategies were evaluated over a period of varying market environ­
ments and demonstrate how options strategies can be used to modify the 
risk-return patterns on the underlying instrument. In both analyses, the 
authors found that the return distributions were sensitive to the choice 
of the simulation period, the length of the holding period, and the choice 
of the option premium levels. 
Bookstaber (1982) employed the portfolio approach of Johnson, Stein, 
and Ederington in a simulation analysis applied to the hedging of mortgage 
loan commitments with Treasury bond futures and options on Treasury bonds. 
In this study, alternative hedge ratios were used in the simulations in 
order to derive the risk-return characteristics of different hedging strat­
egies employing these instruments. Bookstaber estimated the risk-return 
^^Merton, Scholes and Gladstein, in their 1982 article, discuss the 
sensitivity of the return to the simulation period, length of holding 
period, and the options premium on page three. 
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distributions for various combinations of futures and options used to 
hedge a mortgage bank's portfolio. The alternative hedging positions eval­
uated were short sales of Treasury bond futures, writing call options on 
Treasury bonds, buying put options on Treasury bonds, and a combined strat­
egy of writing calls and buying puts on the Treasury bonds. The present 
study differs from Bookstaber's work in a number of ways. First, mortgage 
loan positions are being hedged rather than loan commitments. Second, 
Bookstaber considered only options on cash Treasury bonds, not options on 
Treasury bond futures. Additionally, a number of alternative hedge ratios 
were evaluated rather than using the risk-minimizing hedge ratio developed 
by Ederington. 
Draper and Hoag (1983) used simulation techniques to generate the 
risk-return distributions of alternative hedging strategies involving cash 
holdings of Treasury bonds and Treasury bond futures and/or options on 
these futures instruments. They analyzed five alternative strategies for 
bond hedging consisting of the following positions; long bonds, long fu­
tures contracts, long call options on the bond futures, long bonds and 
short futures, and long calls and short bond futures. The strategies em­
ploying futures contracts used four alternative maturity dates for the con­
tracts, and three alternative futures options' exercise prices were assumed 
in the strategies using options positions. For each strategy, it was as­
sumed that the hedge was maintained for six months. For each future and/or 
futures options position taken, a one-to-one hedge ratio was constructed; 
i.e., there was no estimation of an optimal hedge ratio for the strategy 
employed. 
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Both the prices of the Treasury bond futures and the options on the 
futures were simulated in the analysis. Only call options prices were es­
timated in the analysis, and the options pricing model used in the study 
was the Black model developed previously in this chapter. Because options 
on Treasury bond futures were not yet traded at the time of their research. 
Draper and Hoag did not test the simulated model prices against actual 
trading prices of the options. 
The authors found that, in a period of declining cash bond prices, 
both futures and options on these futures improved bond portfolio returns 
and reduced the standard deviation of the return in almost all of the 
cases. This research, thus, provides evidence that hedging strategies us­
ing futures options can improve the return and reduce the risk of a cash 
position during a period of declining cash instrument prices. 
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CHAPTER IV'. 
TESTS OF THE OPTIONS PRICING MODEL 
In order to estimate the returns to strategies which incorporate the 
use of options on Treasury bond futures contracts, options prices must be 
approximated for periods when the contracts were not traded. The option 
pricing model used to approximate contract prices must provide reasonably 
close estimates of the prices at which the contracts would have traded. 
The purpose of this chapter is to test the predictive power of the Black 
option pricing model developed in Chapter III for pricing call and put 
options on Treasury bond futures contracts. 
The data used in testing the Black model are described in the first 
section. There are only two parameters of the model which are not direct­
ly observable, the risk-free rate of interest and the variance of the 
2 fractional change in the futures price, or a • Alternative procedures for 
estimating the variance are discussed in the second section, and the ra­
tionale for the selection of the procedure used is also presented. In 
the last section, the actual prices of traded call and put prices are com­
pared to the Black model's estimates of these prices in order to measure 
the accuracy of the model. 
Data Specifications 
There are five parameters of the Black options pricing model: the 
price of the underlying futures contract, the exercise price of the option, 
the option's time to expiration, the risk-free rate of interest, and the 
variance rate of the fractional change in the price of the futures 
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contract. The futures price which is used in testing the Black model is 
the first closing price of the Treasury bond futures contract on which the 
option is written on the date at which the option's price is estimated. A 
number of alternative exercise prices for both call and put options are 
used for each specified futures contract. These coincide with the actual 
exercise prices of traded options on the specified contracts on the speci­
fied trading dates. 
The times to expiration for the options are derived from the Chicago 
Board of Trade's calendar of contract expiration dates. The variable used 
in the Black model is the fraction of a year until the option's expira­
tion. The time to expiration is then the number of days until expiration 
divided by three hundred and sixty-five. 
The proxy used for the risk-free rate of interest in the model is the 
market rate on Treasury bills with maturity closest to'the expiration date 
of the option's contract. The variance rate that should be used is more 
problematic than the other model parameters. The criteria for selecting 
the variance rate are presented in the following section. 
Futures Price Variance Estimation Techniques 
The variance of the price of the underlying futures contract, or its 
volatility, is the most difficult of the Black model's parameters to es­
timate. The method of estimation used in this study incorporates the use 
of historical data in approximating the instantaneous variance.^ Alter­
native specifications of the length of past observations are used to 
^Bookstaber (1981) provides an extensive description of alternative 
procedures for calculating the volatility of corporate stock prices and an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these procedures. 
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approximate the variance. Two alternative methods are then used to se­
lect the measure of volatility which is included in the options pricing 
model -
The historical variance estimate used as a proxy for the instantane­
ous variance is calculated by converting the observations on the futures 
price into rates of return where the rate of return is defined as: 
"t = Ft/Ft-l- (4-1) 
and and are the futures contract's prices at times t and t-1. The 
natural logarithms of are then used to approximate the continuously 
compounded return. The mean of the rate of return is then calculated as: 
n 
m = 1/n z InRL, (4-2) 
t=l ^ 
where n is the number of observations on R^. The variance of the continu­
ously compounded return is calculated as: 
cf = 365 z (lnR+-m)2. (4-3) 
" t=l ^ 
Because daily observations for the futures price series are used, the sum 
of the squared deviations from the mean return is multiplied by three hun-
2 dred and sixty-five in order to get an annualized rate of return. 
2 Parkinson (1983) derived an alternative measurement procedure for 
estimating the variance of the rate of return based on the extreme values 
of the observed futures prices. This procedure uses the high and low 
prices of the futures contract for each unit time interval. He argued 
that this procedure provides a superior estimate to the use of the price 
levels for each unit time interval because the variance of the extreme 
value estimator is smaller for a given sample size. The estimates of the 
variance using Parkinson's procedure did not prove to be as good as the 
one month historical estimates using either the implied variance test or 
the pricing error tests described below. 
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Three alternative lengths of periods are used in calculating the his­
torical variance — one, three, and six months of daily observations of 
the futures contract prices. Two procedures are used to select the his­
torical variance estimator to be used in the pricing model. The first pro­
cedure is a grid search method which is used to solve for the implied 
variance for a given option's price. In this procedure, the observable 
pricing model parameters are combined with a starting value of the unob-
servable variance to generate an implied price of the option. By using 
2 different values of a , the Black model is solved iterative!,/ until a 
2 
value of a is found which minimizes the difference between the observed 
and estimated options prices. The values used for the implied standard 
deviation range from .05 to .40 in increments of .001 units. The value 
2 
of a which minimizes the difference between the observed option price 
and the value generated by the Black model is then the implied variance 
of the option.^ 
The values of the historical variances for the alternative lengths 
of observations are then compared to the model's implied variance in order 
to determine which estimate most closely approximates the model's variance. 
The grid search procedure generated values of the implied standard devia­
tions for both call and put options and alternative trading days, futures 
contracts and exercise prices are presented in Table 4-1, columns four 
and five. La Tané and Rendleman reason that, if the market is pricing op­
tions and risk efficiently, given the risk-free rate of interest, the same 
^Belongia and Gregory (1984) used the same procedure to solve for the 
implied variance in order to test the efficiency of the Treasury bond fu­
tures options market. 
Table 4-1. Standard deviations of the return on futures contracts 









option One-month Three-month Six-month 
10/15/82 Mar 1983 70 .182 .223 .268 .223 .190 
72 .244 — — — 
74 .195 — — — 
76 .207 .190 
78 .204 - - -
01/14/83 Mar 1983 74 .149 .143 .137 .175 .202 
76 .219 .130 
78 .126 .125 
80 .137 .138 
04/15/83 Sep 1983 70 .140 .117 .110 .134 .148 
74 .113 .109 
76 .104 .110 
78 .107 .110 
80 .107 - - -
01/26/83 Mar 1983 68 .050 .116 .116 .166 .201 
70 .050 .147 
72 .125 .143 
74 .127 .131 
01/26/83 Jun 1983 68 .112 .116 .117 .162 .196 
70 .126 .133 
72 .124 .131 
74 .128 .135 
76 .131 .116 
78 .115 .131 
^Dashed line (—) means that no option price was reported for the contract on this date. 
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variance should apply to all options traded on a given futures contract on 
a particular day.^ It is obvious from Table 4-1 that, for either calls or 
puts on a given contract and date, the implied variances for different ex­
ercise prices are not all equal. 
For five of the six contracts for which implied standard deviations 
are calculated, the one-month historical variance estimates are substan­
tially closer to the implied standard deviations than are either the three-
or six-month estimates. This is true for each alternative exercise price 
used. Also, except for the options traded on October 15, 1982, the one-
month historical estimates were in each case less than either the three-
or six-month estimates. 
In all cases except for contracts traded on October 15, 1982, the 
three- and six-month estimates were greater than any of the implied values. 
It is quite possible that the implied standard deviations for this date 
are an aberation, because options on Treasury bond futures contracts only 
began trading in this month and, as a consequence, the market might not 
have developed sufficiently to price the options efficiently. 
A direct test of the efficacy of the alternative historical variances 
in estimating the variance of the futures return can also be used. In 
this test, the three alternative estimates are calculated for a sample of 
trading dates and these values are then combined with tne other model pa­
rameter values to determine the estimated option prices. The estimated 
values of both call and put options for different contract months and 
^Belongia and Gregory (1984, p. 10) found that, judgmentally, the es­
timated differences of the implied variances were small. In half of the 
cases examined, the spread is .026 points or less. 
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exercise prices are then compared to the actual prices for the options 
traded on these contracts. The resulting estimates using the alternative 
standard deviations are presented in Table 4-2 for call options and Table 
4-3 for put options together with the observed option prices. The histori­
cal variance estimates and the other model parameters used are given in 
Table A-1 of the appendix. 
The results of the direct test of the predictive power of the Black 
model using the alternative historical variances are consistent with the 
grid search procedure. In approximately eighty percent of the cases, us­
ing the one-month variance estimate results in a more accurate estimate of 
the call option price than when the three-month estimate is used. In no 
case does the six-month variance estimate generate the best estimate of 
the call option price. The results of the test are the same with respect 
to the accuracy of the put price estimates. In more than two-thirds of 
the cases presented in Table 4-3, the smallest absolute prediction error 
results from using the one-month variance estimate, and in none of the 
cases is the absolute prediction error the smallest when the six-month 
variance estimate is used. 
The estimates of the call and put option prices using the one-month 
variance estimates do not exhibit a systematic bias. Of the fifty-five al­
ternative call price estimates, in twenty-four cases the estimated price 
is larger than the actual price, while, in thirty-one, it is less. The 
same result holds for the put price estimates using the one-month esti­
mates. In twenty-nine of the fifty-one cases, the estimated option price 
is greater than the actual price, and, for twenty-two of the cases, it is 
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11/15/82 Mar 1983 
01/14/83 Mar 1983 
01/14/83 Jun 1983 
01/26/83 Jun 1983 
02/15/83 Jun 1983 
68 9.000 8.753 9.090 9.090 
70 7.297 7.082 7.530 7.531 
72 5.828 5.566 6,117 6.119 
74 4.469 4.239 4.870 4.871 
76 3.391 3.123 3,796 3.797 
78 2.437 2.222 2.896 2.896 
80 1.703 1.527 2.163 2.165 
68 8-844 8.810 8.016 8.001 
70 6.844 6.837 6.895 6.952 
72 4.875 4.917 5.051 5.182 
74 3,234 3.164 3.418 3.621 
76 1.672 1.751 2.096 2.347 
78 .703 .894 1.148 1.400 
80 .297 .299 .556 .763 
70 6.437 6.424 6.771 7.085 
72 5.000 4.879 5.327 5.706 
74 3.703 3.547 4.072 4.497 
76 2.672 2.460 3.019 2.611 
78 1.703 1.623 2.170 1.924 
80 1.031 1.017 1.215 1.133 
68 5.187 5.219 5.658 6.057 
70 3.781 3-672 4.258 4.736 
72 2.516 2.402 3.081 3.606 
74 1.625 1.449 2.138 2.672 
76 1.000 .802 1.422 1.926 
78 .625 .405 .906 1.350 
68 5.625 5.454 5.602 5.982 
70 4.000 3.906 4.110 4.593 
72 2.672 2.620 2.863 3.412 
74 1.641 1.635 1.886 2.448 
76 .891 .946 1.172 1.696 
78 ..500 .505 .686 1.134 
80 .281 .249 .378 .732 
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Table 4-2. Continued 
Date Contract Exercise price Actual 
Estimated variance 
One- Three- Six-
month month month 
03/15/83 Jun 1983 68 8.062 7.996 7.997 8.120 
70 6.062 6.153 6.146 6.376 
72 4.234 4.465 4.448 4.801 
74 2.703 3.019 2.994 3.450 
76 1.516 1.883 1.853 2.355 
78 ,734 1.075 1.047 1.523 
80 .359 .559 .537 .931 
03/15/83 Sep 1983 74 3.047 3.192 3.391 4.093 
76 2.047 2.224 2.415 3.137 
78 1.375 1.357 1.656 2.352 
80 .781 .680 1.092 1.725 
82 .453 .366 .693 1.238 
04/14/83 Sep 1983 72 6.156 5.978 6.201 6.355 
74 4.406 4.357 4.679 4.882 
76 2.891 2.997 3.375 3.615 
78 1.844 1.892 2.320 2.575 
80 1.078 1.111 1.516 1.760 
82 .594 .601 .940 1.154 
06/15/83 Dec 1983 72 3.844 4.008 3.982 4.207 
74 2.625 2.799 2.768 3.025 
76 1.609 1.815 1.820 2.082 
78 .984 1.156 1.128 1.369 
80 . .563 .682 .658 .860 
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Table 4-3. Actual and estimated put options prices 
Estimated variance 
Exercise One- Three- Six-
Date Contract price Actual month ironth month 
11/15/82 Mar 1983 
01/14/83 Mar 1983 
01/14/83 Jun 1983 
01/26/83 Jun 1983 
02/15/83 Jun 1983 
68 .469 .326 .663 .663 
70 .781 .609 1.057 1.058 
72 1.156 1.047 1.598 1.600 
74 1.859 1.574 2.304 2.306 
76 2.625 2.512 3.185 3.186 
78 3.750 3.566 4.240 4.241 
80 4.969 4.824 5.461 5.462 
70 .031 .014 .064 .131 
72 .094 .079 .214 .345 
74 .344 .311 .565 .768 
76 .813 ,882 1.228 1.479 
78 1.813 1.921 2.264 2.516 
80 3.406 3.401 3.657 3.864 
70 .453 .439 .785 1.100 
72 .781 .837 1.286 1.665 
74 1.406 1.450 1.975 2.400 
76 2.313 2,308 2.867 3.314 
78 3.328 3.415 3.963 4.404 
80 4.797 4.754 5.924 5.661 
68 .313 .322 .761 1.160 
70 .922 .723 1.308 1.786 
72 1.625 1.399 2.078 2.603 
74 2.687 2.393 3.083 3.616 
76 3.906 3.693 4.314 4.817 
78 5,406 5.244 5.744 6.189 
68 .297 .352 .500 .880 
70 .672 .759 .964 1.446 
72 1.328 1.428 1.672 2.220 
74 2.281 2,399 2.650 3.212 
76 3,500 3,665 3.891 4.415 
78 4.953 5,180 5.360 5.808 
80 6,937 6.879 7.008 7.362 
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Table 4-3. Continued 
03/15/83 Jun 1983 
03/15/83 Sep 1983 
04/14/83 Sep 1983 
06/15/83 Dec 1983 
68 .063 .062 .056 .185 
70 .125 .187 .175 .410 
72 .313 .467 .447 .803 
74 .719 .989 .962 1.420 
76 1.469 1.821 1.792 2.293 
78 2.687 2.981 2.955 3.430 
80 4.281 4.434 4.415 6.382 
72 1.000 1.369 1.279 1.916 
74 1.719 2.108 2.007 2.710 
76 2.703 3.061 2.957 3.679 
78 3.937 4.222 4.123 4.819 
74 .281 .567 .888 1.092 
76 1.141 1.128 1.526 1.765 
78 2.000 1.983 2.411 2.665 
80 — — — 3.143 3.547 3.791 
72 .844 1.000 .979 1.204 
74 1.531 1.718 1.687 1.945 
76 2.578 2-692 2.660 2.923 
78 3.781 3.919 3.890 4.132 
80 5.281 5.366 5.342 5.544 
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less. This is not true for the estimated call or put option prices when 
either the three- or six-month variance estimates are used. In all but 
two cases, the estimated call option prices are greater than the observed 
prices using the three-month estimate, and in only one case is the esti­
mated put price less than the observed price when these variance estimates 
are used. 
The Predictive Power of the Black Options 
Pricing Model 
In the last section, it was demonstrated that the estimated options 
prices generated from the Black model most closely approximate the ob­
served prices of call and put options when the one-month historical vari­
ance estimates are used in the model. In order to test the usefulness of 
the Black model using this variance estimate, the values of the estimated 
call and put prices must be compared to the observed option prices. 
Because trading in Treasury bond futures options began in October, 
1982, estimated options prices generated from the Black model on futures 
contracts with maturities in 1983 are used to test the model's accuracy. 
Estimates for these futures contracts for alternative dates and exercise 
prices are presented in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 and Table A-2 of the Appendix. 
A total of eighty-four call prices and seventy-nine put prices are esti­
mated. 
There is no evidence that the estimates of call gptions prices gener­
ated from the Black model are biased estimates of actual call prices. Of 
the eighty-three prices estimated, thirty-eight were less than the actual 
prices and forty-five are greater than the actual prices. The call 
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estimates are also reasonably close estimates of the actual prices. 
Fifty-nine of these differ by less than two-tenths of a point, or $200, 
from the actual prices of the traded options, while, in twenty-five cases, 
the difference is larger than this amount. If the 1982 trading date con­
tracts are excluded, only eleven of the sixty-five estimates differ from 
the traded prices by more than two-tenths of a point, while fourteen of 
the nineteen 1982 differences are greater than this. 
A probable explanation for the greater predictive power of the model 
for the 1983 trading dates is the newness of the market. This possibly 
resulted in inefficiencies which were corrected as the market developed 
greater breadth and traders of the contract became more experienced in 
pricing these contracts. The closeness of the estimated and actual call 
prices is also demonstrated by the fact that twenty-eight of the estimated 
prices were within one-tenth of a point, or $100, of the traded prices. 
The mean square error of the eighty-four estimates is .0423, and the root 
mean square error is .2063, or approximately $200. 
As is the case for the estimated call option prices, the put price 
estimates generated from the Black model and the put-call parity equation 
are reasonably close estimates of the actual put trading prices. There is 
little evidence of a systematic bias in the put price estimates in either 
direction. Forty-five of the estimated put prices are greater than the 
actual trading prices, while thirty-four are less. 
In fifty-eight of the seventy-nine cases, the estimated price is with­
in $200 of the actual price, while the difference is greater than this in 
the other twenty-one cases. In thirty-two of the cases, the difference 
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between the estimated and actual prices is less than one-tenth of a point; 
i.e., in forty percent of the cases, the model's estimates are within $100 
of the actual prices. The mean square error and root mean square error of 
the seventy-nine observations are .0569 and .2385, respectively. 
As is the case for call options, a greater proportion of the estimated 
put prices for the 1982 trading dates are substantially different from the 
actual prices than is true for the 1983 trading date estimates. Seven of 
the eighteen estimates for 1982 dates differ by more than two-tenths of a 
point from the actual prices. When the put-call parity equation is used 
to price put options, a substantial estimation error for a call price will 
generally also cause a substantial error in the estimated put price. 
There is no evidence that the accuracy of the estimated option price 
is correlated with either the time to expiration of the option or the dif­
ference between the futures contract's price and the exercise price of the 
option. For example, the estimated put options prices are substantially 
worse for the September, 1983, contract estimated for March 15, 1983, 
than the June 15, 1983, estimates of the December, 1983, option prices, 
even though the times to expiration are almost exactly the same. In some 
cases, the farther in-the-money are the contracts, the closer are the es­
timated and actual prices, while, in other cases, the estimated prices of 
these options have a greater magnitude of error than do the out-of-the-
money options. 
These tests of the Black options pricing model using the one-month 
historical variance estimate provide evidence that the model is appropriate 
for estimating options prices for those periods when actual trading prices 
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do not exist. It was demonstrated that the model generates unbiased esti­
mates for both call and put options, and that these estimates are within 
acceptable ranges of the actual option prices. 
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CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE 
HEDGING STRATEGIES 
In this chapter, the results of the empirical tests of the alterna­
tive hedging strategies discussed in Chapter III are presented. In the 
first section, the specifications of the data used in the tests are de­
scribed. The procedure used in estimating the risk-minimizing hedge ratio 
and the results of the estimation are presented in the second section. 
The first part of the third section contains a discussion of the alterna­
tive strategies evaluated and also the procedures used in estimating the 
distribution of returns for the strategies. The results of the empirical 
tests are then presented and analyzed. The fourth section deals with the 
estimation of the return distributions to the strategies using a simulation 
technique of reversing the time series of observations on the mortgage and 
futures contract prices. The results of the estimates for the two estima­
tions are compared and conclusions about the efficacy of the alternative 
strategies are presented in the last section. 
Data Specifications 
In this section, the structure of the data used in the empirical 
tests of the strategies and their sources is described. The first diffi­
culty in evaluating the strategies is to construct an appropriate price 
series for fixed-interest-rate mortgages because there is no published 
series of market prices of mortgages. In order to construct a mortgage 
price series, a market mortgage interest rate series must be used. The 
series selected for this analysis was the average contract commitment rate 
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for fixed-interest, seventy-five percent loan-to-price ratio, twenty-five 
year conventional mortgages. This monthly series is published in the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal. The commitment rate was used 
rather than the closing rate on mortgage loans because it is likely to be 
a better measure of the current market rates on mortgages and, thus, ef­
fective rates in the secondary market. 
This mortgage interest rate series was converted into a mortgage 
price series by using a table of "Prepayment Mortgage Values" published in 
the Thomdïke Encyclopedia of Banking and Financial Tables, Revised Edi­
tion (1980). The table used assumed an eight percent twenty-five year 
mortgage which will be prepaid in the twelfth year. It was, thus, assumed 
that twenty-five year mortgages with an interest rate of eight percent, a 
loan-to-price ratio of seventy-five percent and expected prepayment in the 
twelfth year are being hedged. An eight percent mortgage price basis was 
selected because Treasury bond futures contracts are based on an eight 
percent coupon Treasury bond, and this puts the mortgage and Treasury bond 
futures price series on the same basis. 
The first closing prices of the Treasury bond futures contracts were 
used in the hedges for both the dates of initiation and lifting of the 
hedges, respectively- Since it was assumed that each hedge was initiated 
on the fifteenth day of the month and maintained for six months, the first 
closing prices of the futures contracts on these dates was used. If the 
fifteenth day was not a trading day, the date closest to this day was used. 
The futures price data were taken from the Chicago Board of Trade Founda­
tion commodity price data base tapes for the years 1977 through 1983. 
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The futures price series used in calculating the historical variance 
estimates were the daily first closing prices of the Treasury bond futures 
contracts used for each hedging period. The data used in calculating the 
returns from placing stop orders were also daily observations on the Trea­
sury bond futures contracts' prices for the selected hedging periods. 
Since the stop orders are executed if the price of the futures contract 
exceeds a specified level at any time, daily highs of the quoted prices 
were used. In all cases, the futures price data were taken from the Board 
of Trade's data tapes. 
The structure of the data used in the Black options pricing model and 
its sources were discussed in Chapter IV. In this section, the specific 
type of data required for the simulations of the options prices and its 
sources are described. Because the hedging periods used in the analysis 
cover only the period for which the underlying futures contracts were 
traded, the futures prices used in estimating the option prices were ob­
tained from the data tapes. Since call and put options' exercise prices 
are established at even-numbered integers in increments of two points, the 
exercise prices used in the simulations were determined on this basis. 
For each hedging period, both call and put options prices were estimated 
for exercise prices closest to the initial futures price and meeting the 
above specifications, and for exercise prices two points above and below 
this value. 
The futures contract used for each hedging period was the contract 
nearest to maturity for which options on the contract had not expired 
at the time the hedge was lifted. Consequently, because the option 
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contracts initially have from six to eight months until expiration, the 
interest rate used as a proxy for the risk-free rate was the average yield 
on six-month U.S. Treasury bills traded in the secondary market during the 
week containing the fifteenth day of the month. This series was con­
structed from data published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
Because Treasury bond futures options were not traded for most of the 
period being analyzed, the time to expiration must be approximated. This 
was done by using the dates of expiration of the underlying futures con­
tracts and the Board of Trade's specifications for expiration dates of op­
tions on Treasury bond futures discussed in Chapter II. The data specifi­
cations for calculated values of the historical variances estimated were 
described in Chapter III. 
Estimation of the Risk-Minimizing Hedge Ratio 
In Chapter III, it was demonstrated that the ratio of futures con­
tracts to cash instruments which minimizes the variance of the return to a 
hedged position can be estimated by the coefficient of the regression of 
the change in the cash instrument's price on the change in the price of 
the futures contract. If the purpose of the hedge is to minimize the 
variance of the return, or the risk, of a cash position, this ratio can be 
considered to be the optimal hedge ratio. The results of estimations of 
this ratio using alternative time periods and cash/futures relationships 
are presented in this section. These estimates are then used in deter­
mining the risk-return distributions of the alternative hedging strategies. 
It was assumed that each position was maintained for six months. Con­
sequently, the data used in the estimations were monthly observations for 
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the six-month changes in the mortgage and Treasury bond futures contract 
prices. The first hedge was assumed to be established on July 15, 1978, 
and the last hedge lifted on December 15, 1983. 
The slope coefficient for the regression of the changes in mortgage 
prices on changes in the futures contract prices using the six-month peri­
ods was .7040. The coefficient was significant at the .0001 level. In 
order to minimize the risk of the position, each $100,000 of mortgage hold­
ings would be hedged by selling .704 Treasury bond futures contracts. The 
results of the alternative estimations are presented in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1. Régression estimates for changes in mortgage and futures prices 
Uncorrected Corrected for autocorrelation 
Contemporary Lagged Contemporary Lagged 
Futures price changes Futures Futures 
prices prices 
Constant .0732 .4587 -.6379 .2230 
(.115)* (1.141) (-.768) (.444) 
Futures prices .7040 .8551 .4596 .7648 
(8.6713) (16.787) (4.534) (11.729) 
n 50 59 60 59 




^Values of the t-statistics are shown in the parentheses. 
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The coefficient of determination, R^, was .5645, which would indicate 
that a substantial proportion of the movement in mortgage prices is not 
offset by movements in the futures prices. As was discussed in Chapter 
III, the coefficient bf determination is an estimate of the efficiency of 
the hedge, or the percentage reduction in the variance of the hedged posi­
tion as compared to the unhedged position. 
The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there was 
first order autocorrelation of the residuals. When the estimates were 
corrected for autocorrelation, the optimal hedge ratio estimate declined 
substantially to ,4596 and the coefficient of determination was reduced to 
.2999.^ The coefficient for changes in futures prices was still signifi­
cant at the .0001 level. 
2 The values of R for both the uncorrected and corrected regressions 
indicate that a substantial part of the variation in the cash prices is 
not eliminated by the hedge. Milliard and Haney (1982) estimated the lag 
structure of the relationship between long-term government bond yields 
and mortgage interest rates. They found that, during the latter part of 
the 1970s, changes in mortgage interest rates lagged behind changes in the 
yields on long-term government bonds by approximately one month. To the 
extent that yields on government bonds and Treasury bonds futures prices 
Hhe procedure used to correct for autocorrelation of the residuals 
in the PRCC AUTOREG subroutine of the Statistical Analysis System package. 
The procedure is equivalent to a generalized least squares estimate of 
the regression coefficients with appropriate weights. The lag length 
specified for the procedure is six periods because the autocorrelation 
coefficient for this length is significantly different from zero. 
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move synchronously, there will also be approximately a one-month lag be­
tween changes in Treasury bond futures prices and mortgage prices. 
When the optimal hedge ratio was reestimated incorporating the lagged 
relationship between changes in futures prices and mortgage prices, both the 
value of the hedge ratio and the coefficient of determination of the re­
gression increased substantially. This was true for both the regressions 
not corrected for, and corrected for autocorrelation of the residuals. The 
respective uncorrected and corrected hedge ratios were .8551 and .7648; 
thus, each unit value of the cash position is hedged with a larger futures 
2 position using these estimates. The increase in the R value from .2999 
to .7295 for the corrected estimates indicates that using the lagged posi­
tion would increase the efficiency of the hedge by approximately forty-
three percent. 
In essence, the incorporation of the lagged relationship between the 
futures and cash market positions creates an anticipatory hedging situa­
tion. Assume that a financial institution is planning to hedge a cash 
holding of mortgages at time t and the position will be maintained until 
time t+n. The futures transaction is made at time t-1 and lifted at t+n-1. 
Thus, to initiate the hedge, the futures market transaction must be under­
taken in the period before the cash position is established and lifted one 
period prior to the end of the hedge. 
If the cash position being hedged is newly issued mortgage loans, this 
strategy should not create substantial difficulties, since institutions 
which lend on these mortgages generally can predict within a narrow range 
what quantity of commitments will be taken down during the next month. 
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Also, if seasoned mortgages are being continuously hedged by rolling over 
the futures position, the difficulties of hedging the position would be 
substantially reduced, since only when the initial position is established 
will there be uncertainty in determining the size of the futures position 
to take. 
The return distributions for the alternative hedging strategies using 
each of the hedge ratios and contemporaneous and lagged hedge position are 
presented in the following section. 
Return Distributions for Alternative Strategies 
The purpose of any hedging strategy is to alter the risk-return dis­
tribution from that of the unhedged position. In this section, the means 
and standard deviations of the returns for the alternative hedging strate­
gies are analyzed for the contemporaneous and lagged mortgage and futures 
cases developed in the previous section. 
For each strategy, it was assumed that the cash and futures positions 
were held for six months and that the futures contract used was the con­
tract closest to maturity for which options had not yet expired at the time 
the hedge was lifted. A total of sixty hedge positions were established 
for the contemporaneous series and fifty-nine for the lagged series. For 
each of the alternative strategies, the mean and standard deviation of the 
returns were estimated for four alternative series — the contemporaneous 
and lagged series using both the risk-minimizing hedge ratios uncorrected 
for autocorrelation, and corrected for autocorrelation. 
As Merton, Scholes and Gladstein (1982, p. 3) have emphasized, "The 
return statistics for the various option strategies are sensitive to the 
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choice of the simulation period and to the length of the holding period 
between revisions." Although their research was conducted on stock op­
tions, this is true for any study of alternative investment strategies 
based on past history. The returns to option strategies are also affected 
by the choice of premium levels for the options. Because the average re­
turns to options positions are especially sensitive to the periods chosen, 
they provide unreliable indicators of expected future returns. The re­
sults presented in this section should be considered to be indicators of 
the returns for one sample, not a definitive test of the alternative stra­
tegies. 
The means and standard deviations of the returns for the strategies 
evaluated for the alternative periods and hedge ratios are presented in 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3. The maximum and minimum returns over the periods are 
given in Table 5-5, and the returns for each period using the corrected 
hedge ratio are presented in Tables A-3 and A-4 of the appendix. 
Although the sample period of July, 1978, through December, 1983, 
was one in which interest rates generally increased and mortgage and fu­
tures prices consequently declined, there was substantial variation in 
both the size of price change and the direction of change. For thirty-
eight of the sixty periods, the mortgage price fell with a maximum de­
crease of 20.030 points. The largest increase in the mortgage price was 
12.680 points for this period. 
The mean return for the unhedged mortgage position over the period 
was -1.763 points (a $1,763 loss on a $100,000 position) and its standard 
deviation was 7.007 points. Both the loss to the position and the 
Table 5-2. Mean and standard deviation of returns for alternative strategies: Contemporaneous mort­
















Unhedged mortgages -1.763 7.007 -1.763 7.007 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 









Mortgages, futures and call 
Exercise price > futures 
Exercise price = futures 

















Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures 
Exercise price = futures 
















Mortgages, futures and stop 
Three point order 
Four point order 














^All stop order and options positions are estimated using the risk-minimizing hedge ratios of 
.7040 and .4569, respectively. 
Table 5-3. Mean and standard deviation of returns for alternative strategies: Lagged mortgage and 
futures series (in thousands of dollars) 
Not corrected Corrected for 
for autocorrelation autocorrelation 
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Strategies return of return return of return 
Unhedged Mortgages -1.728 7.061 -1.728 7.061 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 









Mortgages, futures and call options® 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point order 
Four point order 













^All stop order and options positions are estimated using the risk-minimizing hedge ratios of 
.7040 and .4569, respectively. 
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variability of the return were substantially reduced when the cash posi­
tion was hedged using either a one-to-one hedge ratio or the risk-minimiz­
ing ratio. The mean return for the one-to-one ratio using the contempora­
neous mortgage/futures strategy was .845 and its standard deviation was 
5.126. If the cash position is hedged using the lagged strategy, the re­
turn for the period using the optimal hedge ratio was substantially closer 
to zero, .227, and its standard deviation was also considerably smaller, 
2.975. Thus, hedging the cash position using the lagged futures strategy 
and the optimal hedge ratio corrected for autocorrelation of the residuals 
would have increased the mean return by approximately $1,950 for each 
$100,000 of mortgages held and reduced the variance of the return by 
eighty-two percent. Also, the minimum return was reduced by almost seven­
ty-five percent for this strategy. 
Selling futures contracts and simultaneously purchasing call options 
on these contracts results in a lower mean return and a larger variance 
of the return than when only futures are used in the hedge. This is the 
case, no matter whether the contemporaneous or lagged position .was used, 
the hedge ratio selected, and the relationship between the initial futures 
price and the option's exercise price. For example, using the lagged fu­
tures and the corrected hedge ratio, the mean returns for options with ex­
ercise prices greater than, equal to, and less than the initial futures 
price were -.910, -1.083 and -1.216, respectively. The respective values 
of the standard deviations of returns were 3.972, 4.373, and 4.777. 
Because the sample period was one of generally declining futures 
prices, the purchase of call options would not have been necessary, ex 
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post, in the majority of cases. The purchase of call options was more 
beneficial in periods when the futures price was increasing, since the 
call options would not be exercised when the futures price at the end of 
the hedging period was less than the option's exercise price. The mean 
return in each case was also largest for the out-of-the-money call options 
and the standard deviation of the return the smallest. This is to be ex­
pected, because the farther out-of-the-money the call option, the lower 
its price will be; thus, the lower is the cost of purchasing an option 
that expires without being exercised. The use of call options on the fu­
tures reduced the maximum loss by from forty to fifty percent from that of 
the unhedged position, but was also greater than for using futures con­
tracts without purchasing options. 
The means and standard deviations for hedging by purchasing put op­
tions on the underlying futures contracts were essentially the same as for 
futures and call options strategies for equal options exercise prices. 
This is to be expected, because, as was demonstrated in Chapter III, the 
purchase of put options replicates the sale of futures contracts and the 
purchase of call options on the contracts if the options have the same ex­
ercise prices. For each of the exercise prices, the maximum and minimum 
returns were also essentially the same for the alternative strategies. 
During a period of declining cash and futures prices, it would be 
better to hedge using call options with exercise prices greater than the 
selling price of the futures contracts in that the mean return was larger 
and the standard deviation of returns was smaller the larger was the ex­
ercise price relative to the future's selling price. This was also true 
for the put options hedging strategy. 
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When stop orders were placed on the futures contracts, the mean re­
turns were smaller and the standard deviations larger than when the orders 
were not used. This was the case for all three of the levels of stop 
orders used, for both price series, and for both hedge ratios used. For 
the three alternative stop-out limits used, the closer was the stop-out 
price to the initial selling price of the futures contract, the smaller 
was the mean return and the greater was the standard deviation of returns. 
The closer the stop-out price is to the initial selling price of the 
futures contract, the greater is the probability that the futures contract 
will be offset during the hedging period when, ex post, it should not 
have been. This was the case for the periods used in the sample. For the 
lagged hedging strategy, the stop out order was executed in thirty of the 
fifty-nine periods for a three point limit above the futures selling price, 
twenty-four times for the four point limit, and twenty times for the five 
point limit. For the three point limit in fourteen of these periods, the 
futures price at the end of the period was less than the initial selling 
price, while this was true for only nine periods for the four point limit 
and only seven periods for the five point limit. In almost fifty percent 
of the periods, the stop order was executed when, in retrospect, it should 
not be when the loss limit was three points; this was true for thirty-five 
percent of the periods for the five point limit. 
The maximum loss for the sample period was from five to six points 
larger when the stop-out orders were used than when there were no limits 
established for the futures price. For each limit, this occurred in peri­
ods when the futures contract position was closed out and the mortgage and 
futures prices subsequently declined. 
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The results of the sample period estimates indicate that the pure 
hedging strategy of selling futures contracts outperformed each of the 
stop order and options positions in terms of either the mean return or the 
standard deviation of returns criteria. These results are consistent with 
what would be expected from the theory of hedging. The purpose of using 
either options or stop loss orders is to reduce the losses from declines 
in the cash instrument's price without sacrificing the gains from increases 
in its price. During periods of declining cash prices, as was the case 
for the sample period, the futures-only strategy should outperform the 
other strategies. 
Using the mean-variance criterion, it is not possible to determine 
whether stop order strategies are better than options strategies. Although 
the mean return was larger for all of the stop order positions than for 
any of the call or put options strategies, in some cases, the standard de­
viation was also larger for the stop order positions than for the options 
strategies. For example, the five point stop order had the largest mean 
return and smallest variance of the stop order strategies, while the same 
was true for the options strategies with exercise prices greater than the 
initial futures price. However, although the mean return was larger for 
this stop order limit than for the options position, its standard devia­
tion of the return was also larger. This was also true for the stop order 
and options strategies with the smallest mean returns. The choice of 
using stop orders or options positions would then depend on the utility 
functions of the individual hedger. 
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If, however, the purpose of the hedge is to avoid large losses while 
not sacrificing the opportunity for large gains, the options strategies in 
this case should be used. The maximum and minimum returns were larger for 
all of the options positions than for any of the stop order positions. 
Returns to the Hedging Strategies for the Reverse Series 
' The advantage of using options on futures contracts in the hedging 
strategy is that the purchase of an options contract gives the holder the 
right, but does not obligate him/her, to take a position in the futures 
market. Consequently, an options strategy should provide a relatively 
better return to the hedged position during a period of generally rising 
prices for the cash and futures instruments. Placing stop orders on the 
futures contracts should also increase the returns to the pure futures 
hedge since the futures position would be closed out if its price in­
creased by a sufficient amount. 
In order to evaluate the risk-return distributions of the alterna­
tive strategies being analyzed, a simulation of the mortgage, futures 
and options prices was undertaken. The simulation procedure used was to 
reverse the mortgage and Treasury bond futures price series. The prices 
of the mortgages and futures contracts at the time the hedge was placed 
for the initial price series then became the end-of-period prices, and the 
prices at the termination of the hedges became the initial instrument 
prices. 
The values used in the option pricing model to estimate the call and 
put prices were then the observed values at the end of each hedging peri­
od. For example, the six-month Treasury bill rate for January 15, 1983, 
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was proxy for the risk-free of interest for the hedge for the period from 
January 15, 1982, through July 15, 1982. The historical variance used in 
the hedge was estimated from the date of the end of the original hedge 
using daily futures prices for the next month. 
As in the case for the initial estimates, the risk-return distribu­
tions for the alternative strategies were estimated for the contemporane­
ous mortgage and futures series and the lagged series using both the cor­
rected and uncorrected risk-minimizing hedge ratios. The results of the 
estimations of the mean return and the standard deviations of the returns 
are presented in Tables 5-4 and 5-5, the maximum and minimum returns Ta­
ble 5-6 and the returns for each period in Tables A-5 and A-6 of the Ap­
pendix. 
The mean returns for the unhedged position and for the hedged posi­
tions using only futures contracts were simply the values for the initial 
series, but with the opposite signs. The standard deviations of the re­
turns to these positions were the same for both the initial and reverse 
price series. 
Using the lagged relationship of mortgage and futures prices and the 
corrected optimal hedge ratio, the standard deviations of the returns were 
smaller for all of the strategies evaluated, but the mean returns were also 
less than for the unhedged position in every case. Thus, hedging using 
different combinations of futures, stop orders, and options would have re­
duced the variance of the unhedged position, but only by sacrificing a 
larger return. By reducing the ratio of futures contracts sold per unit 
of mortgages held, the returns could have been increased, as is evident by 
Table 5-4. Mean and standard deviation of returns for alternative strategies: reverse price series 
and contemporaneous mortgage and futures prices (in thousands of dollars) 
Not corrected Corrected for 
for autocorrelation autocorrelation 
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Strategy return of return return of return 
Unhedged mortgages 1.763 7.007 1.763 7.007 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 









Mortgages, futures and call options^ 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point order 
Four point order 













^All stop order and options positions are estimated using the risk-minimizing hedge ratios of 
.8551 and .7648, respectively. 
Table 5-5. Mean and standard deviation of returns for alternative strategies: Reverse series and 















^ of return 
Unhedged mortgages 1.728 7.061 1.728 7.061 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 









Mortgages, futures and call options® 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point order 
Four point, order 













®A11 stop order and options positions are estimated using the risk-minimizing hedge ratios of 
.8551 and .7648, respectively. 
Table 5-6. Maximum and minimum returns for alternative strategies: Corrected hedge ratio (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Strategy 
Initial series: Reverse series: 
Contemporaneous Lagged Contemporaneous Lagged 
Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum 
Unhedged mortgages 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 
Optimal hedge ratio 
12.680 -20.030 12.680 -20.030 20.030 -12.680 20.030 -12.680 
16.120 -11.217 9.322 
10.465 -15.980 9.484 
Mortgages, futures and call options 
Exercise price > futures price 10.524 -
Exercise price = futures price 11.093 -
Exercise price < futures price 11.579 -
Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures price 10.582 
Exercise price = futures price ii.infi 
Exercise price < futures price 
11.106
11.548 
Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point order 10.899 
Four point order 10.827 





















•16.120 4.814 - 9.322 
•10.455 5.400 - 9.484 
•12.644 13.965 -13.035 
•12.454 14.938 -13.665 
•11.959 15.849 -13.349 
12.611 14.203 -12.939 
-12.464 15.014 -13.665 
•12.032 15.763 -13.463 
•14.131 16.125 -14.564 
•14.605 16.125 -14.524 
•12.638 16.125 -13.930 
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comparing the returns to the alternative strategies for the uncorrected 
and corrected hedge ratios, the uncorrected ratio being the larger one. 
The mean return for each of the alternative options and stop order 
positions was larger than when only futures contracts were used. This sup­
ports the argument for the use of these strategies; that, during a period 
of increasing prices, the returns from their use will be greater than for 
hedges using only futures contracts. However, the variance for each al­
ternative option and stop order strategy was also greater than for the 
futures-only hedge. 
The results of the futures/call options and put options strategies 
support the evidence from the initial series that buying put options repli­
cates selling futures and buying call options with the same exercise prices 
as the puts. 
Although the variance of the returns was less the larger was the op­
tion's exercise price, as was the case for the initial series, the mean 
return was smaller the higher the option's exercise price. The estimated 
difference in the mean return was from -$520 to -$750 for using options 
with $4,000 higher exercise prices. 
The mean-variance distributions of the stop order strategies were al­
so altered when the reverse price series was used. The closer the stop 
order was placed to the initial futures price, the larger was the mean re­
turn and the standard deviation of the returns. In a period over which 
the futures contract price generally increases, the probability that the 
stop order is executed when, ex post, it should not have been is reduced. 
Even when the stop order was only three points above the initial futures 
selling price, there were only five periods for which the stop order was 
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executed and the futures price subsequently fell below its initial price. 
Although the mean return was larger the closer the stop order to the ori­
ginal selling price of the futures contract, it was only $160 for a $2,000 
difference in the limit price. 
The maximum gains for the options and stop order strategies were sub­
stantially larger than for the futures hedges as would be expected. These 
ranged from approximately $8,500 to $10,800 more than the maximum returns 
for the optimal hedge using only futures contracts. It was also the case 
that the maximum losses from both the options and stop order strategies 
were greater than for using only futures and also than for the initial 
series. The maximum losses for the stop orders occurred in each case when 
the mortgage price fell substantially but the futures position had been 
closed out. 
The maximum losses for each of the options strategies were not repre­
sentative for the series. For each call and put strategy, the maximum 
loss occurred in the period from April, 1980, to October, 1980, when the 
mortgage price rose by over ten points (for the reverse series, it fell 
by this amount). This was during the credit crunch of 1980 and the mort­
gage rate used for April was not reflective of actual rates, since the 
volume of lending declined substantially for this month. The futures 
prices for the initial and end-period dates were different by less than 
one point for this period. There are no other periods during the series 
when the loss for any option position was greater than ten points, and 
only two for which the loss was greater than seven points. 
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The performance of the stop orders vis-a-vis options strategies dur­
ing a period of generally increasing prices depends on the limits estab­
lished and the relationship between the option exercise prices and the 
initial futures prices. For example, the three point loss limit on the 
futures contract had a slightly lower mean return and larger standard de­
viation of return than did the call option strategy using in-the-money 
options. However, the five-point stop order strategy had a higher mean 
return than did the out-of-the-money call strategy and substantially the 
same standard deviation of returns. Thus, during the sample period, the 
performance of the stop order strategies vis-a-vis options strategies de­
pended on the specific order limits and option exercise prices used. 
Returns to the Alternative Strategies 
for the Combined Series 
Combining the initial and reverse series would result in a sample 
period for which there was no drift in the prices of the mortgage and fu­
tures instruments, but substantial variation in the prices within the 
period. The mean returns for the unhedged mortgage position, and the 
hedged positions using only the T-bond futures contracts would be zero 
over the entire sample period. The standard deviations of the returns 
would simply be the values for either of the sample periods. 
The mean returns and standard deviations of the returns for each of 
the alternative options and stop order strategies would be the average for 
the two time series. The mean and standard deviations of the returns for 
the alternative strategies are presented in Table 5-7. 
Table 5-7. Mean and standard deviation of returns for alternative strategies: Combined 
and lagged relationship (in thousands of dollars) 
series 















Unhedged mortgages 0 7.061 0 7.061 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 









Mortgages, futures and call options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages and put options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 













Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point order 
Four point order 














There is no clearly superior call options strategy for this series. 
Although buying call options with exercise prices less than the initial 
futures price would have resulted in the largest return, the standard de­
viation of the returns for this strategy was the highest of any of the call 
options strategies. This would not have been the case for the put options 
strategies. Purchasing puts with exercise prices higher than the initial 
futures prices would have provided the largest mean return and the small­
est standard deviation of the returns. 
Each of the alternative call and put options strategies had a lower 
mean return and a larger standard deviation than the futures/only strate­
gies. Thus, ex post, the use of options would have been an inferior stra­
tegy to using only futures contracts in the hedge. The risk-return distri­
butions obviously depend on the premiums paid for the options, but each 
of the options strategies had a mean return at least $283 less than the 
futures strategies. It Is extremely unlikely that the estimated options 
prices could have been biased upward by this amount. 
The mean returns for the stop order hedges were all extremely close 
to zero, but their standard deviations were substantially larger than was 
the case for the hedges using only futures contracts. Thus, the protec­
tion against upward movements in the futures price would have resulted in 
significantly greater variability in the returns. In retrospect, if stop 
orders were placed on the futures contracts, it would have been best to 
use stop orders placed five points above the initial futures price, since 
the standard deviation of the returns is smallest for this strategy. 
As was true for both the initial and reverse series, it is not possi­
ble to conclude that using stop orders would have been superior to the use 
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of futures options. Although the stop order strategies resulted in higher 
mean returns than did the options strategies, the standard deviations of 
the returns were larger for the three and four point stop orders than for 
any of the call or put options strategies. 
Comparison of the Alternative Strategies 
The risk-return distributions of the alternative hedging strategies 
estimated for the initial and reverse sample periods provide useful infor­
mation for evaluating the performance of these strategies. For each of the 
strategies, the risk of the cash position, as measured by the standard de­
viation of the returns, was substantially reduced both in periods of de­
clining and increasing prices (see Table A-7 of the Appendix for the ef­
ficiency in reducing the variance of returns for the alternative strate­
gies). Each of the alternative strategies also produced a mean return 
closer to zero than did the unhedged position when prices increased or de­
creased. As expected, hedging reduces both the loss to the cash position 
caused by declining prices, and the gain to the position resulting from in­
creasing prices. 
The results of the simulations support the conclusion that using 
either options or stop orders increases the mean return for the hedge dur­
ing a period of increasing cash and futures prices, but also increases the 
volatility of the return. The standard deviation of the returns was larg­
er than when the hedged position contained only futures contracts for each 
of the alternative options or stop order strategies during both the ini­
tial and reverse series experiments. 
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The use of stop orders to limit losses on the futures position re­
sulted in a substantial alteration in the risk-return distribution of the 
hedge. The closer the stop-out price to the initial futures price, the 
greater the volatility of the return during both periods of rising and 
falling prices. Also, the closer the stop loss limit to the initial fu­
tures price, the farther the mean return was from zero. There is, thus, 
no clearly superior choice of the level at which the stop order limit 
should be placed for both periods of increasing and decreasing cash prices. 
However, for a period of stationary prices containing substantial price 
movements within the period, using a higher stop order limit would result 
in a smaller variance of the returns without reducing the mean return. 
As is the case with stop orders, there is no options strategy that 
provides the best risk-return distribution for both periods of increasing 
and decreasing prices. For both of the sample periods, the standard de­
viations of the returns were smallest when the exercise prie of the op­
tion was larger than the initial futures price. On the basis of risk re­
duction, this is clearly the best strategy. However, the mean return for 
the position using these exercise prices (although negative) was largest 
when mortgage prices were declining but smallest for periods of increasing 
prices. None of the exercise price levels provided both a higher mean re­
turn and smaller standard deviation of returns in both periods of declin­
ing and increasing prices. 
As was discussed in Chapter III, placing stop orders on the futures 
position taken is an alternative to the purchase of options on the con­
tracts. In each case, the purpose of the strategy is to protect against 
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losses in periods when the hedged instrument's price is falling without 
foregoing the gains when the instrument's price increases. In selecting 
which of these alternatives is superior, it must be determined whether the 
premium paid for the option is offset by the probability that the stop 
order is exercised when, ex post, it should not have been. 
For the initial price series, the loss for each of the stop order 
limits used was less than for any of the option strategies. This was not 
true for the reverse series comparisons. The options positions with ex­
ercise prices less than the initial futures prices had larger mean returns 
than for any of the stop order limits but, when the exercise prices were 
higher than the futures price, the mean returns were lower than for any of 
the stop orders. 
The same results hold with respect to the risk distributions. For 
both the initial and reverse price series, the standard deviation of the 
returns of the stop order positions were in some cases less than, and in 
others greater than, those of the options positions. For both price series, 
the risk reduction potential of the futures/stop order hedge as compared 
to the futures/call option or put option hedge depends on the specific 
stop-out limits and options exercise prices. However, using five point 
stop orders did produce a larger mean return and a smaller standard devia­
tion than when at-the-money options were used for both the initial and re­
verse sample periods. 
Although the five point stop order outperforms the at-the-money op­
tion for both periods, there is no clearly superior strategy for any other 
pairwise comparisons. It is not possible to conclude that the stop order 
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strategies are in general superior to options strategies, nor that the 
use of options provides a better risk-return than do stop order strategies. 
99 
CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Review of the Empirical Results 
The Black options pricing model together with the put-call parity 
equation provides good estimates of the prices of put and call options on 
Treasury bond futures contracts for the period for which these option 
contracts have been traded. For the sample period used in this study, 
these estimates exhibited no systematic bias for either the call or put 
options, and approximately forty percent of the estimates were within one-
tenth of a point ($100) of the actual trading prices. There was also no 
evidence that the difference between the estimated and actual prices varied 
systematically with either the time to expiration of the option or the re­
lationship between the futures contract price and the exercise price of the 
option. The improvement in the predictive power of the model for the 1983 
period is best explained by the newness of the contract in 1982. As the 
market achieves greater maturity, the predictive power of the model can be 
retested using both contracts traded at a later date and a larger sample 
size. 
As expected, the use of Treasury bond futures contracts to hedge mort­
gage price risk can substantially reduce the risk of the cash position. 
When the lagged relationship between futures and mortgage prices was in­
corporated in the hedging strategy, the variance of thé returns was reduced 
by approximately seventy-three to eighty-two percent depending on the opti­
mal hedge ratio used. Based on these results, it can be concluded that 
the risk reduction potential of hedging with futures contracts holds for 
both increases and decreases in mortgage prices. 
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The incorporation of either options on futures contracts or stop 
order limits on the futures contracts in the hedging strategy would sub­
stantially alter the risk-return distributions from that of the strategy 
which used only futures contracts. During periods of generally declining 
cash and futures prices, i.e., generally rising interest rates, any of the 
alternative options or stop order strategies tested would have resulted in 
a smaller mean return and a larger standard deviation of the returns than 
would the pure futures hedge. Assuming hedging is undertaken to reduce 
the risk of the position, each of the alternative options or stop order 
strategies have been inferior to hedges using only futures contracts. How­
ever, for the period of declining prices, all of the options and stop order 
strategies tested outperformed the unhedged position both in terms of pro­
viding a larger mean return and a smaller variance of the returns. 
Each of the alternative options and stop order strategies provided a 
larger mean return than the pure futures hedge during the period of gener­
ally increasing prices, i.e., generally falling interest rates. However, 
each of these strategies also had a larger variance of the returns than 
the futures hedge. Thus, hedging using options or stop orders would reduce 
the mean return by less than would using only futures contracts during a 
period of increasing prices, but the variance of returns would be in­
creased. 
The results of the sample period mean-variance estimates presented in 
Table 5-2 through 5-5 suggest that there is no one options or stop order 
strategy that is clearly superior to all of the other strategies for both 
periods of declining and increasing cash instrument prices. 
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Selecting one option or one stop order strategy as optimal requires 
an evaluation of the hedger's tolerance for risk. In each case, the alter­
native positions have different risk-return distributions, depending on 
the direction of mortgage price changes. 
Ex post, the estimated option prices used in the simulations appear to 
be reasonable. If the estimated prices were either too high or low, the 
options strategies would provide returns which were either lower or higher 
than the respective stop order strategies. This was not the case. For 
both periods of declining and increasing mortgage and futures prices, the 
mean returns for some of the stop order limits were larger than for some 
of the alternative options strategies. However, there was no one stop 
order strategy that provided a higher mean return than all of the options 
strategies for both sample periods. However, based on the results of the 
estimates for the combined sample period, it can be concluded that hedges 
using stop orders would provide a higher mean return than any of the al­
ternative options strategies during periods when there is no general price 
trend for the cash and futures instruments. Additionally, the five point 
stop order provided a higher mean return and lower standard deviation than 
did the use of either call or put options with exercise prices equal to, 
or less than, the initial futures price. Thus, it would appear that this 
stop order would be better than either of these options strategies if the 
hedger had no expectations about the direction of prices' movements. Addi­
tionally, the generally larger variance of the returns for the stop order 
strategies as compared to the options strategy further limits the choice 
of any strategy as superior to the other strategies. 
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Limitations of the Study and Suggestions 
for Further Research 
The empirical tests of alternative strategies to hedge against mortgage 
price risk which have been conducted in this study could be extended in a 
nunter of directions. Ideally, a daily price series for seasoned mort­
gages would be used to evaluate the hedging performance of the alternative 
strategies. However, there is currently no organized market which trades 
seasoned mortgages; consequently, daily trading data on mortgage prices do 
not exist. 
The assumption that the mortgages being hedged are eight-percent 
twenty-five-year fixed-rate loans facilitates the estimation of the optimal 
hedge ratio and the estimation of the risk-return distributions of the al­
ternative strategies. Extending the empirical tests to the hedging effec­
tiveness of strategies for alternative fixed interest rates and other types 
of mortgage contracts would provide useful information for the mortgage 
holder. The recent growth in the use of alternative mortgage instruments, 
such as adjustable rate, graduated payment and balloon payment loans will 
undoubtedly alter the hedging strategies of institutions which hold mort­
gage portfolios. Reestimation of the optimal hedge ratios and estimation 
of risk-return distributions for these instruments is essential for effec­
tive hedging of interest rate risk. 
As Merton, Scholes and Gladstein (1982, p. 3) have emphasized for 
simulations of stock options returns, the returns to the alternative fu­
tures options strategies are sensitive to the premiums paid for the op­
tions. Although there is no evidence of systematic bias in the simulated 
options prices used in this study, further testing of the Black model 
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should be conducted as the futures options market matures. Further test­
ing of the model would provide a check on the accuracy of the risk-return 
distributions estimated. 
Although three different exercise prices for the options were used in 
this study, additional testing of options which are further in-the-money 
and out-of-the-money could be useful in evaluating how the mean-variance 
distribution of the returns to the cash position would be altered by using 
alternative option exercise prices. 
The results of the stop order estimations support the conclusions 
that placing stop order limits further above the original futures prices 
will reduce the probability that the orders will be executed when, ex post, 
they should not have been. The results provide evidence that the greater 
the difference between the stop-out limit and the original futures price, 
the closer is the mean return to zero and the smaller the variance of the 
return. 
A useful area of research is the determination of an optimal stop 
order limit. The larger (smaller) the difference betweer; the stop-out 
price and the initial futures price, the smaller (greater) the probability 
that the order will be executed when, ex post, it should not have been. 
But increasing (decreasing) this difference will also reduce (increase) 
the return when the futures price increases over the hedging period. The 
difficulty in attempting to determine an optimal stop limit value is that 
one must know the probability that the futures price will surpass the stop 
limit during the period but fall below the initial futures price at the 
termination of the hedge. Thus far, there is little published research 
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which evaluates the use of stop orders in hedging strategies, and none in 
which a theoretical analysis of the optimal stop order limit is developed. 
As with any study based on past experience, one must exercise care in 
using the simulations undertaken in this study as an indicator of the fu­
ture performance of the alternative strategies. The results are obviously 
dependent upon the trend of cash mortgage prices and the volatility of the 
prices. Future trends and volatility could be substantially different. 
Finally, it should not be concluded that any strategy dominates any 
other one. If the options and the underlying futures contracts are cor­
rectly priced, there will be no best strategy for all hedgers. Since the 
patterns of returns of the various strategies are not the same, investors 
with different risk tolerances will have different optimal strategies. 
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11/15/82 Mar. 1983 76.625 95 .0891 .03423 
01/14/83 Mar. 1983 76.875 34 .0808 .01890 
01/14/83 June 1983 76.156 126 .0816 .01890 
01/26/83 June 1983 73.031 144 .0795 .01394 
02/15/83 June 1983 73.219 94 .0876 .01874 
03/15/83 June 1983 76.063 66 .0884 .02129 
03/15/83 Sept. 1983 76.063 157 .0884 .02129 
04/14/83 Sept. 1983 75.719 137 .0871 .01194 
06/15/83 Dec. 1983 75.125 156 .0934 .01408 
Table A-2. Actual and estimated call and put options prices 
Date Contract 
10/26/82 December 1982 
12/27/82 June 1983 
02/25/83 June 1983 
04/04/83 June 1983 
04/04/83 September 1983 
Exercise 
price 
Call options Put options 
Actual Estimated Actual Estimated 
70 5.406 5.767 .156 .513 
72 3.625 4.247 .406 .983 
74 2.391 2.973 1.000 1.698 
76 1.234 1.969 1.859 2.685 
78 .594 1.232 3.156 3.937 
68 8.719 8.765 .563 .617 
70 7.094 7.212 1.000 1.003 
72 5.609 5.810 1.625 1.539 
74 4.469 4.577 2.469 2.245 
76 3.187 3.525 3.000 3.131 
78 2.313 2.651 4.469 4.196 
80 1.531 1.948 6.000 5.432 
68 9.000 8.928 .063 .060 
70 7.156 7.075 .156 .171 
72 5.406 5.439 .313 .410 
74 3.609 3.826 .594 .850 
76 2.313 2.568 1.266 1.555 
78 1.313 1.607 2.141 2.558 
68 8.250 8.164 .016 .003 
70 6.250 6.209 .047 .026 
72 4.313 4.335 .141 .131 
74 2.578 2.680 .391 .454 
76 1.234 1.413 1.016 1.116 
70 6.000 5.913 .406 .378 
72 4.375 4.369 .875 .770 
74 2.969 3.059 1.375 1.395 
76 2.047 2.019 2.297 2.292 
78 1.234 1.253 3.406 3.461 
Table A-3. Returns to alternative hedging strategies: Contemporaneous 
mortgage and futures prices for initial series 
Initial Change Change One-to-one Optimal Stop orders: 
date in in hedge hedge Three 
point 
Four 




7/15/78 -3.86 -1.313 -2.547 -3.257 -5.526 -5.727 
8/15/78 -3.55 -3.437 -0.113 -1.970 -1.970 -1.970 
9/15/78 -3.77 -5.719 1.949 -1.142 -1.142 -1.142 
10/15/78 -3.87 -3.905 0.036 -2.075 -2.075 -2.075 
11/15/78 -3.68 -5.563 1.883 -1.123 -1.123 -1.123 
12/15/78 -3.77 -0.906 -2.864 -3.354 -3.354 -3.354 
1/15/79 -3.68 -0.281 -3.399 -3.551 -3.551 -3.551 
2/15/79 -3.62 0.219 -3.839 -3.721 -3.721 -3.721 
3/15/79 -4.02 -1.656 -2.365 -3.259 -3.259 -3.259 
4/15/79 -4.98 -7.437 2.457 -1.562 -1.562 -1.562 
5/15/79 -8.84 -8.437 -0.403 -4.962 -10.449 -4.962 
6/15/79 -8.83 -9.954 1.124 -4.255 -4.255 -4.255 
7/15/79 -8.92 -10.937 2,017 -3.893 -3.893 -3.893 
8/15/79 -9.04 -22.469 13.429 1.287 1.287 1.287 
9/15/79 -14.84 -19.531 4.691 -5.864 -5.864 -5.864 
10/15/79 -20.03 -8.813 -11.217 -15.980 -15.980 -15.980 
11/15/79 -12.14 -2.719 -9.421 -10.890 -13.763 -10.890 
12/15/79 -1.74 3.406 -5.146 -3.305 -3.305 -3.305 
1/15/80 2.40 -1.344 3.744 3.018 .748 -.228 
2/15/80 2.87 -1.344 -3.849 -.218 1.348 .170 
3/15/80 6.17 .608 5.482 5.854 3.958 3.958 
4/15/80 10.01 -0.969 10.979 10.455 8.344 8.157 
5/15/80 5.37 -10.750 16.120 10.311 3.977 3.359 
6/15/80 -6.33 -18.406 12.076 2.129 2.129 2.129 
7/15/80 -11.43 -9.937 -1.493 -6.863 -6.863 -6.863 
8/15/80 -11.48 -10.719 -0.761 -5.554 -6.554 -6.554 
9/15/80 -8.78 -3.812 -4.968 -7.028 -7.028 -7.028 
10/15/80 -6.50 -10.781 4.281 -1.545 -1.545 -1.545 
11/15/80 -6.74 -6.875 0.135 -3.580 -8.492 -8.636 
12/15/80 -6.39 -0.406 -5.984 -6.203 -8.659 -8.659 
1/15/81 -5.22 -7.094 1.874 -1.960 -1.960 -1.960 
2/15/81 -6,47 -4.656 -1.814 -4.330 -8.064 -8.452 
3/15/81 -7.38 -10.281 2.901 -2.655 -2.655 -2.655 
4/15/81 -8.14 -6.156 -1.984 -5.311 -9.591 -9.993 
5/15/81 -6.27 0.250 -6.520 -6.385 -7.807 -8.381 
6/15/81 -2.04 -5.781 3.741 0.617 0.617 0.617 
7/15/81 -1.54 -6.969 5.429 1.663 1.663 1.663 
8/15/81 -0.56 -3.437 2.877 1.020 -2.082 -2.456 
9/15/81 -0.80 2.219 -1.419 -0.220 -0.579 -1.268 
10/15/81 2.34 3.687 -1.347 -.645 -.760 0.401 
11/15/81 2.62 -0.469 3.089 2.836 2.836 2,836 
12/15/81 1.10 -2.937 4.037 2.450 2.450 2.450 
1/15/82 0.38 3.031 -2.651 -1.013 -1.430 -1.473 
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Table A-3. Continued 
Initial Change Change One-to-one Optimal Stop orders 
date in in hedge hedge Three 
point 
Four 




11/15/81 1.55 5.563 -4.013 -1.007 0.171 -0.360 
12/15/81 4.33 4.719 -0.389 2.161 2.836 2.362 
1/15/82 5.91 11.969 -6.059 0.409 4.402 3.555 
2/15/82 9.30 12.312 -3.012 3.641 7.246 7.846 
3/15/82 10.46 14.187 -3.727 3.940 8.837 8.246 
4/15/82 11.97 14.281 -2.311 5.406 10.261 9.744 
5/15/82 12.68 8.531 4.149 8.759 10.899 10.827 
5/15/82 10.94 8.187 2.753 7.177 9.504 8.434 
7/15/82 9.89 3.344 6.546 8.353 8.454 8.353 
8/15/82 6.79 1.250 5.540 6.215 5.196 6.215 
9/15/82 5.22 0.906 4.314 4.804 3.640 3.367 
10/15/82 2.79 -3.981 6.771 4.620 1.354 4.620 
11/15/82 -0.43 -1.531 1.101 0.274 -1.838 -2.297 
12/15/82 -1.01 -4.656 3.646 1.129 -2.403 1.129 
1/15/83 -4.00 -5.813 1.813 -1.328 -1.328 -1.328 
2/15/83 -3.97 -5.500 1.530 -1.442 -1.442 -1.442 
5/15/83 -3.84 -5.656 1.816 -1.240 -1.240 -1.240 
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Table A-4. Returns to alternative hedging strategies: Lagged mortgages 
and futures prices for initial series 
Initial Change Change One-to-one Optimal Stop orders : 
date in in hedge hedge Three 
point 
Four 




8/15/78 -3.55 -1.313 -2.237 -2.5458 -6.322 -6.657 
9/15/78 -3.77 -3.437 -0.333 -1.1414 -1.141 -1.141 
10/15/78 -3.87 -5.719 1.649 0.5039 0.504 0.604 
11/15/78 -3.68 -3.906 0.226 -0.6927 -0.693 -0.653 
12/15/78 -3.77 -5.563 1.793 0.4846 0.485 0.485 
1/15/79 -3.68 -0.906 -2.774 -2.9871 -2.987 -2.987 
2/15/79 -3.62 -0.281 -3.339 -3.4051 -3.405 -3.405 
3/15/79 -4.02 0.219 -4.239 -4.1875 -4.187 -4.187 
4/15/79 -4.98 -1.656 -3.324 -3.7135 -3.713 -3.713 
5/15/79 -8.84 -7.437 -1.403 -3.1522 -3.152 -3.152 
5/15/79 -8.83 -8.437 -0.393 -2.3774 -11.507 -2.577 
7/15/79 -8.92 -9.954 1.034 -1.3072 -1.307 -1.307 
8/15/79 -9.04 -10.937 1.697 -0.6754 -0.675 -0.675 
9/15/79 -14.84 -22.469 7.629 2.3443 2.344 2.344 
10/15/79 -20.03 -19.531 -0.439 -5.0927 -5.093 -5.053 
11/15/79 -12.14 -8.813 -3.327 -5.3998 -5.400 -5.400 
12/15/79 -1.74 -2.719 0.979 0.3395 -4.441 0.339 
1/15/80 2.40 3.406 -1.006 -0.2049 -0.205 -0.205 
2/15/30 2.87 -1.344 4.214 3.8979 0.122 -1.504 
3/15/80 6.17 6.719 -0.549 1.0313 6.637 1.677 
4/15/80 10.01 0.688 9.322 9.4838 6.329 6.329 
5/15/80 5.37 -0.969 6.339 6.1111 2.598 2.287 
6/15/80 -6.33 -10.750 4.420 1-8916 -8.648 -0.676 
7/15/80 -11.43 -18.406 6.976 2.6469 2.647 2.647 
8/15/80 -11.48 -9.937 -1.543 -3.8802 -3.880 -3.880 
9/15/80 -8.78 -10.719 1.939 -0.5821 -0.542 -0.582 
10/15/80 -6.50 -3.812 -2.688 -3.5446 -3.515 -3.585 
11/15/80 -6.74 -10.781 4.041 1.5053 1.805 1.505 
12/15/80 -6.39 -6.875 0.485 -1.1320 -9.306 -9.545 
1/15/81 -5.22 -0.406 -4.814 -4.9095 -8.996 -8.956 
2/15/81 -6.47 -7.094 0.624 -1.0445 -1.045 -1.045 
3/15/81 -7.38 -4.656 -2.724 -3.818 -10.033 -10.678 
4/15/81 -8.14 -10.281 2.141 -0.2771 -0.277 -0.277 
5/15/81 -6.27 -6.156 -0.114 -1.5619 -8.684 -9.353 
6/15/81 -2.04 0.250 -2.290 -2.2312 -4.597 -5.553 
7/15/81 -1.54 -5.781 4.241 2.3813 2.891 2.881 
8/15/81 -0.56 -6.969 6.409 4.7699 4.770 4.770 
9/15/81 0.80 -3.437 4.237 3.4256 -1.733 -2.355 
10/15/81 2.34 2.219 0.121 0.6429 0.046 -1.102 
11/15/81 2.62 3.687 -1.067 -0.1998 -0.009 -0.606 
12/15/81 1.10 -0.469 1.563 1.4587 1.459 1.459 
1/15/82 0.38 -2.937 3-317 2.6262 2.626 2.626 
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2/15/82 1.55 3.031 -1.481 -0.7681 -1.461 -1.533 
3/15/82 4.33 5.563 -1.233 0.0754 2.036 1.151 
4/15/82 5.91 4.719 1.191 2.3009 3.424 2.636 
5/15/82 9.30 11.969 -2.669 0.1461 6.791 6.380 
6/15/82 10.46 12.312 -1.852 1.0438 7.042 7.042 
7/15/82 11.97 14.187 -2.217 1.1198 9.269 8.285 
8/15/82 12.68 14.281 -1.801 1.7579 9.835 8.975 
9/15/82 10.94 8.531 2.409 4-4155 7.976 7.857 
10/15/82 9.89 8.187 1.703 3.6285 7.500 5.903 
11/15/82 6.70 3.344 3.446 4.2326 4.400 4.233 
12/15/82 5.22 1.250 3.970 4.2640 2.567 4.264 
1/15/83 2.79 0.906 1.854 2.0971 0.161 -0.293 
2/15/83 0.43 -3.981 3.551 2,6147 -2-820 2.615 
3/15/83 
-1.01 -1.531 0.521 0.1609 -3.352 -4.117 
4/15/83 
-4.00 -4.656 0,656 -0.43909 -6-3133 -0.439 
5/15/83 
-3.97 -5.813 1.943 0.47578 0.4758 0.475 
6/15/83 
-3.84 -6.500 1.660 0.36540 0.5664 0.366 
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Table A-5. Returns to alternative hedging strategies: Contemporaneous mort­






















1/15/79 3.86 1.313 2.547 3.257 2.409 2.007 
2/15/79 3.55 3.437 -.113 1.970 2.071 1.6S9 
3/15/79 3.77 5.719 -1.949 1.142 2.291 1.798 
4/15/79 3-87 3.906 -0.036 2.075 2.448 2.017 
5/15/79 3.68 5.563 -1.883 1.123 2.229 1.784 
6/15/79 3.77 0.906 2.864 3.354 3.354 3.354 
7/15/79 3.68 0.281 3.399 3.551 3.551 3.551 
8/15/79 3.62 -0.219 3.839 3.721 3.721 3.721 
9/15/79 4.02 1.656 2.364 3.259 2.483 3.259 
10/15/79 4.98 7.437 -2.457 1.562 2.926 2.926 
11/15/79 8.84 8.437 0.403 4-962 7.231 6.915 
12/15/79 8.83 9.954 -1.124 4.255 7.365 6.288 
1/15/80 8.92 10.937 -2.017 3.893 7.398 6.723 
2/15/80 9.04 22.469 -13.427 -1.287 7.575 6.557 
3/15/80 14.84 16.531 -4.691 5.864 12.743 12.743 
4/15/80 20.03 8.813 11.217 15.980 17.876 17.876 
5/15/80 12.14 2.719 9.421 10.890 10.531 9.899 
6/15/80 1.74 -3.405 5.146 3.305 3.305 3.305 
7/15/80 
-2.40 1.344 -3.744 -3.018 -4.282 -4.282 
8/15/80 
-2.87 -6.719 3.849 0.218 -4.292 -5.024 
9/15/80 
-6.17 -0.688 -5.482 -5.854 -7.578 -8.152 
10/15/80 
-10.01 -0.969 -10.979 -10.455 -11.805 -12.294 
11/15/80 
-5.37 10.750 -16.120 -10.311 -6.921 -7.567 
12/15/80 6.33 18.406 -12.076 -2.120 4.937 4.219 
1/15/81 11.43 9.937 1.493 6.863 9.735 9.304 
2/15/81 11.48 10.719 0.761 6.554 9.713 9.627 
3/15/81 8.78 3.812 4.968 7.028 7.358 6.697 
4/15/81 6.50 10.781 -4.281 1.545 4.978 4.547 
5/15/81 6.74 6.875 -0.135 3.580 5.332 4.485 
6/15/81 6.39 0.406 5.984 5.203 4.896 4.408 
7/15/81 5.22 7.094 -1.874 1.960 3.827 3.324 
8/15/81 6.47 4.656 1.814 4.330 5-048 4.502 
9/15/81 7.38 10.281 -2.901 2.655 5.558 5.498 
10/15/81 8.14 6.156 1.984 5.311 6.618 6.258 
11/15/81 6.27 -0.250 6.520 6.385 4.834 4.360 
12/15/81 2.04 5.781 -3.741 -0.617 -.647 -0.071 
1/15/82 1.54 6.969 -5.429 -1.663 -0.198 -0.672 
2/15/82 0.56 3.437 -2-877 -1.020 -0.905 -1.379 
3/15/82 
-0.80 -2.219 1.419 0.220 -2.638 -2.782 
4/15/82 
-2.34 -3.687 1.347 -0.645 -3.848 -0,645 
5/15/82 
-2.62 0.469 -3.089 -2.836 -2.836 -2.836 
6/15/82 
-1.10 2.937 -4.037 -2.450 -2.551 -3.168 
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Table A-5. Cordinued 
Initial Change Change One-to-one Optimal Stop orders : 
date in in hedge hedge Three 
point 
Four 




7/15/82 -0.38 03.031 2.651 1.013 -1.888 1.013 
8/15/82 -1.55 -5.563 4.013 1-007 1.007 1.0070 
9/15/82 -4.33 -4.719 0.389 -2.161 -2.161 -2.161 
10/15/82 -5.91 -11.969 6.059 -0.409 -0.409 -0.409 
11/15/82 -9.30 -12.312 3.012 -3.641 -3.641 -3.641 
12/15/82 
-10.46 -14.187 3.727 -3.940 -11.853 -3.940 
1/15/83 
-11.97 -14.281 2.311 -5.406 -5.406 -5.406 
2/15/83 
-12.68 -8.531 -4.149 -8.759 -14.131 -14.605 
3/15/83 
-10.94 -8.187 -2.753 -7.177 -7.177 -7.177 
4/15/83 
-9.89 -3.344 -6.546 -8.353 -8.353 -8.353 
5/15/83 
-6.79 -1.250 -5.540 -6.215 -6.215 -6.215 
5/15/83 
-5.22 -0.906 -4.314 -4.804 -6.800 -4.804 
7/15/83 
-2.79 3.981 -6.771 -4.620 -4.198 -4.743 
8/15/83 0,43 1.531 01.101 -0.273 -1.121 -1.509 
9/15/83 1.01 4.656 -3.646 -1.129 -0.383 -0.842 
10/15/83 4.00 5.813 -1.813 1.328 2.592 2.061 
11/15/83 3.97 5.500 -1.530 1.442 2.533 1.944 
12/15/83 3.84 5.656 -1.816 1.240 2.432 1.771 
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Table A-6. Returns to alternative hedging strategies: Lagged mortgage and 
futures prices for reverse series 
Initial Change Change One-to-one Optimal Stop orders 
date in in hedge hedge Three 
point 
Four 




2/15/79 3.55 1.313 2.237 2.545 0.849 0.100 
3/15/79 3.77 3.437 0.333 1.141 1.015 0.266 
4/15/79 3.87 5.719 -1.849 -0.503 1.115 0.179 
5/15/79 3.68 3.906 -0.226 0.692 1.032 0.230 
6/15/79 3.77 5.563 -1.793 -0.484 1.069 0.239 
7/15/79 3.68 0.906 2.774 2.987 2.905 2.905 
8/15/79 3.62 0.281 3.339 3.405 3.379 3.379 
9/15/79 4.02 -0.219 4.239 4.187 4.207 4.207 
10/15/79 4.98 1.656 3.324 3.713 2.118 3.563 
11/15/79 8.84 7.437 1.403 3.152 5.015 5.015 
12/15/79 8.83 8.437 0.393 2.377 5.834 5.246 
1/15/80 8.92 9.954 -1.034 1.307 6.192 4.136 
2/15/80 9.04 10.937 -1.897 0.675 6.205 4.948 
3/15/80 14.84 22.469 -7.629 2.344 12.112 10.962 
4/15/80 20.03 19.531 0.499 5.092 16.125 16.125 
5/15/80 12.14 8.813 3.327 5.399 8.128 8.128 
6/15/80 1.74 2.719 -0.979 -0.339 -1.256 -2.433 
7/15/80 -2.40 -3.406 1.006 0.204 0.515 0.515 
8/15/80 -2.87 1.344 -4.214 -3.897 -6.374 -6.374 
9/15/80 -6.17 -6.719 0.549 -1.031 -8.818 -10.182 
10/15/80 -10.01 -0.688 -9,322 -9.483 -12.631 -13.701 
11/15/80 -5.37 0.969 -6.339 -6.111 -8.713 -9.623 
12/lb/80 6.33 10.750 -4.420 -1.891 3.441 2.238 
1/15/81 11.43 18.406 -6.976 -2.646 8.836 7.498 
2/15/81 11.48 9.937 1.543 3.880 8.324 7.521 
3/15/81 8.78 10.719 -1.939 0.582 5.490 5-330 
4/15/81 6.50 3.812 2.688 3.584 3.852 2.622 
5/15/81 6.74 10.781 -2.041 -1.505 3.905 3.102 
6/15/81 6.39 6.875 -0.483 1.132 3.769 2.191 
7/15/81 5.22 0.406 4.814 4.909 2.438 1.529 
8/15/81 6.47 7.094 -0.624 1.044 3.876 2.939 
9/15/81 7.38 4.656 2.724 3.819 4.732 3.716 
10/15/81 8.14 10.281 -2.141 0.277 5.305 4.635 
11/15/81 6.27 6.156 0.114 1.561 3.435 2.766 
12/15/81 2.04 -0.250 2.290 2.231 -0.635 -1.517 
1/15/82 1.54 5.781 -4.241 -2.881 -1.054 -2.392 
2/15/82 0.56 6.969 -6.409 -4.769 -2.676 -3.559 
3/15/82 
-0.80 3.437 -4.237 -3.428 -3.528 -4.411 
4/15/82 
-2.34 -2.219 -0.121 -0.642 -5.764 -6.031 
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-2.62 -3.687 1.067 0.199 -5.428 0.536 
6/15/82 
-1.10 0.469 -1.569 -1.458 -1.501 -1.501 
7/15/82 
-0.38 2.937 -3.317 -2.626 -3.081 -4.232 
8/15/82 -1.55 -3.031 1.418 0.768 -4.358 1.044 
9/15/82 
-4.33 -5.563 1.233 -0.075 0.431 0.431 
10/15/82 
-5.91 -4.719 -1.19 -2.300 -1.871 -1.871 
11/15/82 
-9.30 -11.969 2.669 -0.146 0.944 0.944 
12/15/82 
-10.46 -12.312 1.852 -1.043 0.078 0.078 
1/15/83 
-11.97 -14.187 2.217 -1.119 -14.564 0.173 
2/15/83 
-12.68 -14.281 1.601 -1.757 -0.457 -0.457 
3/15/83 
-10.94 -8.531 -2.409 -4.415 -13.641 -14.524 
4/15/83 
-9.89 -8.187 -1.703 -3.628 -2.883 -2.883 
5/15/83 
-6.79 -3.344 -3.446 -4.232 -3.928 -3.928 
6/15/83 
-5.22 -1.250 -3.970 -4.264 -4.150 -4.150 
7/15/83 
-2.79 -0.906 -1.884 -2.097 -5.732 -2.015 
8/15/83 0.43 3.981 -3.551 -2.614 -2.191 -3.208 
9/15/83 1.01 1.531 -0.521 -0.160 -1.878 -2.600 
10/15/83 4.00 4.656 -0.656 0.439 1.405 0.549 
11/15/83 3.97 5.813 -1.843 -0.475 1.348 0.359 
12/15/83 3.84 • 5.500 -1.660 -0.366 -1.165 0.068 
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Five E> F E = F E< F E> F E = F E< F 
point 
0.200 -1.052 -1.606 -2.316 -0.896 -1.573 -2.406 
-1.459 -3.228 -3.284 -2.523 -3.141 -3.297 -2.639 
-2.626 -2.863 -1.988 -1.269 -2.786 -2.048 -1.467 
0.768 -1.202 -1.813 -2.548 -1.092 -1.818 -2.669 
-0.075 -2.465 -3.070 -3.780 -2.375 -3.054 -3.838 
-2.301 -5.954 -6.562 -7.244 -5.844 -6.554 -7.338 
-0.146 -2.806 -3.445 -4.187 -2.736 -3.448 -4.264 
-1.044 -3.730 -3.730 -4.427 -2.169 -3.619 -4.465 
-1.120 -3.074 -3.680 -4.410 -2.974 -3.667 -4.483 
-1.758 -3.510 -4.498 -5.327 -3.769 -4.530 -5.431 
-4.415 -6.012 -8.534 -7.406 -5.943 -6.632 -7.471 
-3.629 -6.028 -5.546 -6.428 -4.942 -5.643 -6.520 
-3.928 -6.681 -6.335 -7.160 -5.621 -6.352 -7.255 
-4.150 -5.551 -6.138 -6.654 -5.471 -6.125 -6.785 
-2.015 -4.116 -4.714 -4.907 -4.003 -4.637 -4.982 
-3.513 -3.316 -2.387 -1.580 -3.212 -2.370 -1.651 
-2.814 -1.955 -2.006 -1.176 -1.849 -1.974 -1.220 
0.080 1.285 2.182 2.912 1.366 2.167 2.801 
0.074 0.974 1.931 2.712 1.074 1.949 2.648 
-0.199 -0.968 2.014 2.831 1.077 2.049 2.793 
Table A-7. Percentage reduction in risk for alternative hedging strategies: Corrected hedge ratio 
Strategy 
Initial series Reverse series 
Contemporaneous Lagged Contemporaneous Lagged 
Mortgages and futures 
One-to-one hedge ratio 
Optimal hedge ratio 
Mortgages, futures and call options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 
Exercise price < futures price 
Mortgages & put options 
Exercise price > futures price 
Exercise price = futures price 
Exercise price < futures price 
Mortgages, futures and stop orders 
Three point orders 
Four point order 
Five point order 
.4648 
.4965 
.3846 
.3359 
.2869 
.3837 
.3350 
.2787 
.3406 
.3919 
.4560 
.8079 
.8225 
.6836 
.6164 
.5423 
.6819 
.6150 
.5390 
.5227 
.5875 
.6410 
.4648 
.4965 
.3424 
.2833 
.2244 
.3172 
.2821 
.2249 
.2135 
.2908 
.3629 
.8079 
.8225 
.5457 
.4545 
.4302 
.5448 
.4529 
.4377 
.2707 
.3602 
.5347 
